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THESIS

THE RELIABILITY OF THE WARSAW TREATY
ORGANIZATION: CAN THE SOVIET UNION
DEPEND ON ITS NORTHERN TIER ALLIES?

by

Karen A. Prichard

March 1985

Thesis Advisor:

Jiri Valenta

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The Reliability of the Warsaw Treaty Organization:
Can the Soviet Union Depend On
Its Northern Tier Allies?

by

Karen A. Prichard
Captain, United States Air Force
B.A., East Texas State University, Commerce, Texas, 1971

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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March 1985

Abstract

This thesis examines the reliability of Czechoslovakia, East Germany (GDR), and Poland (the Northern Tier Eastern bloc states) as Soviet allies in case of a war with NATO. The success of Soviet efforts to bind the political, military, and economic systems of these states into a homogenous whole under Moscow's control is evaluated. In spite of a good deal of interdependence among the East Bloc countries, hostility towards the Russians and between the various ethnic groups makes control difficult and reliability questionable in a conflict with the West. East Germany is the most reliable of the three and is not likely to shift its position in the near future in spite of differences of opinion on how to deal with East German-West German relations. Czechoslovakia is outwardly reliable, but only because the people see no chance of breaking the Soviets' grip. Poland is now, and will be for the foreseeable future, an unreliable ally, but one whose geographical position is so vital to the Soviet Union that the Russians will expend whatever resources necessary to keep it under control.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	9
	A. RUSSIAN POLITICAL CULTURE	12
	B. THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION (WTO)	14
	C. COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (COMECON)	20
II.	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	23
	A. CZECHOSLOVAK POLITICAL CULTURE	23
	B. THE GOVERNMENT	26
	C. THE MILITARY	35
	D. CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN THE WTO	52
	E. CZECHOSLOVAK PARTICIPATION IN COMECON	54
III.	THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	58
	A. THE GERMAN POLITICAL CULTURE	58
	B. THE GOVERNMENT	61
	C. THE MILITARY	76
	D. THE GDR IN THE WTO	89
	E. GDR PARTICIPATION IN COMECON	92
IV.	POLAND	95
	A. POLISH POLITICAL CULTURE	95
	B. THE GOVERNMENT	100
	C. THE MILITARY	108
	D. POLAND IN THE WTO	116
	E. POLISH PARTICIPATION IN COMECON	120
V.	CONCLUSIONS	126
	APPENDIX A: CHAPTER II FIGURES	135
	LIST OF REFERENCES	139

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	150
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LIST OF TABLES

I	Czechoslovakia Military Force/Equipment 1964-1983	49
II	Equipment Licensed for Production Outside the USSR	50
III	German Democratic Republic, 1984	85
IV	Polish Military Force/Equipment 1964-1983 . . .	113

LIST OF FIGURES

1.1	WTO Structure--Peacetime Operations	16
1.2	WTO Exercise Patterns 1961-1979	17
A.1	Support for a Continued Socialist Society	135
A.2	Guarantees of Socialist Democracy	136
A.3	Most Trusted Politicians	137
A.4	Extent of Dubcek's Popularity	138

I. INTRODUCTION

Cracks are showing in the Soviet empire. It is costing the Soviets more and more money and political concessions to maintain the united front they like their Eastern European allies to present to the world. Control of Eastern Europe has been a major concern for the Soviet Union since World War II for several reasons:

1. The military security factor. Eastern Europe has served as a buffer zone against possible attack from the West.

2. The springboard factor. Eastern Europe has served as a base for possible military aggression against or the assertion of political influence over Western Europe.

3. The Communist internationalist factor. The Soviets have seen Eastern Europe in expansionist ideological terms, as a vanguard of Communist states forwarding the process of world revolution.

4. The ideological security factor. Eastern Europe has provided a defensive Soviet leadership with an ideological buffer zone in its efforts to secure its own closed system of government against the dangers of outside ideological and political penetration [Ref. 1].

In view of the extremely divisive factors operating among the Eastern bloc nations (.e.g, ethnic rivalries, resentment against the Soviet Union, historically conflicting land claims, poor economic performance, etc.), just how reliable the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) would be in case of a war with NATO is a question Western analysts are studying.

The purpose of this thesis is to assess the political and military reliability of the "Northern tier" states--Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, and Poland--as Soviet allies in case of a war with NATO. Since the term "reliability" is applied differently by different

authors, the following definition offered by Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes will be used:

"Political reliability" includes "the conviction by the political leadership (both Soviet and national Communist Parties) that the armed forces will carry out instructions given to them" as well as "the willingness of significant segments of the armed forces to carry out these orders, either because they have a normative commitment to the regime or because they feel it is in their interest to do so [Ref. 2].

To this definition the following must be added:

Political reliability also involves the conviction of the Soviet leadership that the various Communist Parties will be able to maintain internal control and external loyalty to the Soviet Union, and will, in fact, take the appropriate steps necessary to ensure that control.

In addition the following portions of the Herspring and Volgyes' typology to categorize the reliability of the armed forces will be used:

External-offensive:

The willingness of the military to support the regime in offensive campaigns against other countries [Ref. 3].

External-defensive:

The probability that the armed forces will defend the state against external threats [Ref. 4].

This thesis will be primarily concerned with the external-offensive category, posing the scenario of a war with NATO,

as opposed to attacks on other WTO countries, neutral countries, or the Soviet Union, although some comments will be made on the external-defensive category. (For example, what would happen if Western forces attacked an Eastern bloc country which was not part of an original Warsaw Pact assault against NATO?)

In order to evaluate the reliability of the Northern tier states as Soviet allies, it is necessary to examine the following aspects:

1. The domestic political and economic situation
2. The bilateral relationship between the states and the Soviet Union
3. The multilateral relationships within the WTO and COMECON

These will be discussed for each state in the following format:

1. Development of political culture: History prior to World War II

The government: Relations with the people and the Soviet Union

The military: Relations with the government, the people, and the Soviet Union

The Warsaw Treaty Organization and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON): how these organizations serve as a means of controlling their members and the extent of Northern Tier participation.

To effectively control its satellite states, the Soviet Union must control three key areas: political developments, the military, and the economy. They have imposed the Russian system of operation on all their allies, regardless of whether it is suitable or not. In order to provide a

basis for comparison, the following sections will examine the Russian political culture and general aspects of the organizations the Soviets set up to control the militaries and the economies of their allies.

A. RUSSIAN POLITICAL CULTURE

One of the primary factors causing friction between the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies is the fact that the institutions that the Soviets use to control these countries were designed to accommodate the Russian perceptions of the character of man and the realities of the world. The fact that these perceptions differ radically from the democratic, individualistic, independent political traditions of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland makes the Soviet institutions fit uneasily over these societies. The people of each country have rejected the Russian view of the world and the Soviet systems at some time during the post-World War II period, causing the national communist governments to have to maintain their control by force. This will probably undermine their reliability as Soviet allies in times of crises with the West.

The following discussion will highlight the Russian view of the world and the reasons for its development. This will be contrasted later to Czechoslovak, East German, and Polish traditions to illustrate the reasons for friction and potential unreliability.

The key to the original Russian culture was survival. The people existed in extreme poverty for centuries in the dense forests of far northern Europe. They had nothing to trade except that which came from the forest. One season in seven was an agricultural disaster; and the people were surrounded on all sides by enemies. But they survived and expanded into the east and into Siberia. The smallest

survivable unit was the village. The meaning of an individual's life was defined in terms of the welfare of the village. Man was considered to be "bad" and had to be controlled or he would become a threat not only to himself but also to his village.

The political system consisted of a village council from which one elder emerged as a spokesperson. He was not necessarily the most powerful, but was always the connection to the outside world. Free discussion was allowed within the council until a decision was made. After that, all unanimously supported the decision. Conspiracy and secrecy were basic ingredients of the system. Power (authority) did not flow "up" from the people, rather "down" from the elders. The men were brutal, authoritarian, suspicious, and paranoid about the intentions of the outside world--characteristics still much in evidence today.

As the Russian Slavs moved into the area of Moscow, the village system developed into one in which the most powerful elders resided at Moscow and the most powerful of those (usually the one owning the most land) became the Grand Prince. He was the center of the Russian system and all power radiated from him. The power of the other princes was contingent upon their relationship to the Grand Prince. Their titles meant nothing, as far as being an indication of their real authority. The parallel to today's Soviet leadership is striking.

Since the Russians believe that man is bad and must be controlled for his own good, they set up their political institutions to do just that. The Bolsheviks of 1917 added siege mentality to the system. Since they constantly expected to be attacked and overthrown by "capitalist" forces, they trusted no one, not even those who professed to be allies or friends. The only way they felt secure was if their exact system, headed by their own people, or

"reliable" nationals (usually someone who could be controlled by blackmail), was in place. That there is no room for individuality, nationalism, or democracy in this system is the primary reason for its lack of easy adaptability to countries with those traditions.

The Soviets have not ever, however, relied upon adaptability, preferring instead force and substantial dependence on the Soviet Union. Two of the organizations used to ensure the latter two conditions are the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).

B. THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION (WTO)

The WTO came into existence on 14 May 1955, ostensibly as a reaction to the newly-established NATO.¹ From 1955 to 1960 the organization was relatively dormant. (See Figure 1.1 for the structure.) The political and military organs met only once or twice and there was only one major exercise. However, during that time considerable effort was spent in improving the quality of the manpower and armaments of the various member armies [Ref. 5].

Beginning in 1961 major exercises involving several or all of the member states began occurring frequently. It is Christopher Jones' theory that the WTO maneuvers serve as a basis for periodic reentry of Soviet troops into those countries which do not have them permanently stationed there, as well as being a device to prevent organization members from


¹Romania is an anomaly within the Warsaw Pact, and much of the following discussion of Pact functions and operations does not apply. Romania has no Russian troops stationed on its soil, allows no Pact exercises to be conducted within its territory, conducts a relatively independent foreign policy--sometimes openly breaking with the Soviet Union; and yet it insists on maintaining top level representation on Warsaw Pact and COMECON councils where all members are allowed representatives, and it will participate in command post military exercises.

developing their own territorial defense [Ref. 6].

Figure 1.1, outlining the structure of the Warsaw Pact, certainly seems to support the contention that exercises are the main peacetime function of the organization. The national armies do not take day-to-day orders from the Council of Defense Ministers nor from the Military Council through the Inspectorate or Military Missions, although no doubt there are inputs to national military decisions from the latter in the countries where Soviet troops are stationed.

In order to keep the states from deploying their own system (a la Romania or Yugoslavia), the Warsaw Pact exercises try to limit the amount of time that national forces of a member nation work together as a unit under the control of a native commander. The units are always made up of members from at least two and sometimes more countries; thus it is not easy for national commanders to judge how their troops would function on their own, nor to develop their own defense plans, nor to practice such plans.

There was a common pattern in the staging of the exercises. Approximately one-third on home territory, one-third on foreign territory, and one-third jointly on home and foreign territory. The same pattern occurred in the assignment of exercise commanders. One-third of the time national armed forces were commanded by their own officers and two-thirds of the time they were commanded by foreign officers [Ref. 7]. (See Figure 1.2)



Source: Robert Clawson and Lawrence Kaplan, eds.
The Warsaw Pact: Political Purposes and Military Means, 1982, p. 139

Figure 1.1 WTO Structure--Peacetime Operations

Warsaw Pact Exercises, 1961-79

	Number of Exercises			Total	Commanders			Commanders of Other Nations
	Home Territory	Foreign Territory	Joint		Exercises for which Commander Can Be Identified	Native Comm.	USSR Comm.	
GDR	7	9	11	27	22	3	12	7
Poland	7	7	11	25	21	6	10	5
Hungary	7	7	4	18	10	2	5	3
Czechoslovakia (1961-79)	9	6	10	25	18	5	6	7
(1969-79)	5	4	7	16	11	3	2	6
Bulgaria	4	9	1	14	12	3	5	4

Source: Christopher D. Jones, "The Warsaw Pact: Military Exercises and Military Interventions," Aimed Forces and Society, Vol 7, No. 1 Fall, 1980, p. 13

Figure 1.2 WTO Exercise Patterns 1961-1979

Theoretically the Combined Supreme Command of the WTO controls only the following forces in peacetime:

1. Group of Soviet Forces Germany
2. Northern Group of Forces (Poland)
3. Central Group of Forces (Czechoslovakia)
4. Southern Group of Forces (Hungary)
5. All forces of the National People's Army (NVA) of the German Democratic Republic.

However Soviet influence predominates in the following areas (not applicable to Romania):

1. The Combined Supreme Command and staff of the combined armed forces.
2. The Defense Ministers of the smaller Pact nations in their dual capacity as Deputy Supreme Commanders of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces and supreme commanders of their respective national forces.
3. The Soviet military missions in member nations.
4. The representative of the Combined Supreme Command in each member nation. These Soviet generals have a complete staff, which enables them to function as a guardian organ.
5. The Soviet advisors, who are present in varying numbers and duty positions within the armies of the Pact nations.
6. The Communist Party, to which a large percentage of the officers and NCOs of all Pact armies belong.
7. The state security forces whose power extends even into the armed forces.
8. The many Russian wives of service members of Pact nations. [Ref. 8].

In addition to those factors, the WTO area has an extensively integrated air defense network of which the Supreme Commander is always a Soviet General. Also the High Command of the Baltic Fleet in Leningrad would control the Polish and GDR Navies.

The Chief of Staff of the WTO is always a Soviet General (chosen by "mutual agreement" of "unspecified electors" rather than by the Political Consultative Committee or the Council of Defense Ministers) [Ref. 9], and the exercise scenarios are developed by the WTO staff, which is multinational in composition. There is no indication that national general staffs are given the exclusive responsibility for preparation or conduct of joint exercises at any level [Ref. 10].

Two other ways the Soviets have of influencing the WTO armed forces are through the direction of the training that each force receives and a substantial say in the advancement of their officers to the higher levels of command. The way the Soviets have acquired control over the training of the armies is to require the member states to structure their programs to meet the requirements of the joint WTO exercises, which as indicated earlier, are also designed primarily by the Soviets. At yearly joint meetings of the WTO Military Council and the officers from the member states, the results of the previous year's exercises are reviewed and the schedule and requirements for the next year are set. The decisions of the Military Council are officially only "recommendations," but generally the member states, with the exception of Romania, abide by them. Since the adoption of the recommendations is not mandatory, the commander of the WTO does not rely exclusively on the East European military leaders to carry out the approved training. The group of senior Soviet officers who serve as "liaisons" to the armed forces of each member state "supervise" the compliance with these decisions. [Ref. 11].

The WTO exercises also provide the Soviets with a chance to evaluate the performance of the East European officers that participate in them. It is highly likely that the Soviets use these evaluations and access to the mid-level

and higher training in the Soviet military academies as a means to ensure that the national ministries will only promote those officers who have demonstrated loyalty to the Soviet Union and its doctrine [Ref. 12]. The Soviets maintain a series of mid-career academies that offer highly specialized degrees that are not obtainable in Eastern Europe, and the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in Moscow is the only academy qualified to teach strategic doctrine to senior WTO officers. Its graduates hold a virtual monopoly on the posts of defense ministers, chiefs of staff, and chiefs of main political administrations. There is some evidence to suggest that Eastern European officers are most likely to gain admission to Voroshilov if they already have at least one Soviet degree. It also suggests that only graduates of this school are given command and staff responsibilities in the administration of multinational forces in the joint WTO exercises [Ref. 13]. (Again, Romania is the exception. If there is a command and staff position that allows for rotation of control between the various Pact members, Romania will certainly insist on its turn. The person who is then selected to fill that position will be chosen by Romania, not the Soviet Union, and it is not likely that he will have been educated in the Soviet military schools.)

C. COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (COMECON)

COMECON was another of Stalin's ploys to keep the West from gaining a foothold in Eastern European countries which fell under his influence. When Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland indicated a desire to participate in the Marshal Plan in 1949, Stalin realized some form of economic assistance would have to be made available in addition to military and political coercion. There is some indication, however, that

Stalin himself nipped any real economic integration in the bud by not explicitly entrusting a specific body within the organization with coordination of this effort. He apparently feared that a healthy, cooperative Eastern European bloc might turn into an anti-Soviet bloc. [Ref. 14]

The official goals of COMECON were vague: "exchanging economic experience, extending technical aid to one another, and rendering mutual assistance with respect to raw materials, foodstuffs, machines, equipment, etc." [Ref. 15], but with no specific body to guide and enforce these goals, not much was accomplished during the first fifteen years of its existence. Leonid Brezhnev attempted further integration of the COMECON economies in 1971 when he unveiled, with great fanfare, the Comprehensive Program for Socialist Integration—an attempt to substitute joint planning of key sectors for the politically unattainable supranational planning [Ref. 16]. In 1975, the members adopted the "Concerted Plan of Multilateral Integrations Measures" to implement the Comprehensive Program. This program has very specific targets in five broad categories:

1. Material, financial, and in some cases, labor transfers for the joint projects started in the mid-1970s. This part of the plan represents about 9 million convertible rubles, most of which would be spent in the Soviet Union.
2. Multilateral specialization and cooperation agreements in the engineering and chemical sectors (e.g. computer technology, herbicides, container transport, atomic power stations, private cars, etc.).
3. Scientific and technological cooperation projects to improve and expand new sources of energy, fuels, and essential raw materials.
4. Measures to enhance the development of Mongolia.

5. Consequences of the common actions vis-a-vis third countries. [Ref. 17]

In spite of the fact that these targets were an integral part of the 1976-80 plans with the force of law² in participating countries, available evidence suggests that only limited progress has been made in internationalizing their economies and molding the region into a coherent, interdependent market [Ref. 18]. A sharp downturn in the Eastern European economies which began in 1978 for Poland and Hungary, 1979 in Czechoslovakia, and in 1982 for the GDR, forced delays in some projects caused by bottlenecks in production in one country which then affected production in other countries. [Ref. 19] These economic problems have increased the willingness of the COMECON countries to rely on each other more, thus binding them ever more closely to the Soviet Union.

Having presented the basics of the Soviet institutions for control of political, military, and economic developments in its satellite countries, the following three chapters will look at the results of the imposition of these institutions on Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and Poland. The potential for unreliability will become apparent as the discussion progresses.

²That is, these requirements were supposed to have legal priority over any other national economic requirements or commitments.

II. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A. CZECHOSLOVAK POLITICAL CULTURE

The state of Czechoslovakia came into being on 28 October 1918 as a result of the unconditional surrender of Austria in World War I and the subsequent breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire. It included several nationalities--Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Hungarians, and Ruthenians--of which the Czechs and Slovaks comprised some 65%. A brief look at the history of the area prior to unification is necessary to understand the tensions that are present in the modern state.

Slovakia and the Czech lands of Bohemia, Moravia, and southeastern Silesia are of great strategic importance because they lie at the heart of Europe. Historically these lands have been the crossroads of the cultures of East and West. Because of their great agricultural, mineral, and commercial wealth, they were often subjected to foreign invasion and conquest [Ref. 20]. The Great Moravian Empire was established in the latter half of the century as the Slavonic tribes in the Danube area united to fight the ever present German threat, but this unity did not last very long, as the Czechs seceded from the empire in 895, preferring the rule of the Germans [Ref. 21]. From the late eleventh century forward, the Czechs and Slovaks have maintained a distinctly Western political, social, and cultural orientation [Ref. 22], however until 1950 they also exhibited a sentimental admiration for Russian Slavs (in marked contrast to the Poles), probably because they had not engaged the Russians in direct conflict.

The fifteenth century saw the inception of another very important force in the cultural development of the Czechs--Hussitism. John Hus, a Protestant reformer, tried to fight the abuses of the Catholic Church by stressing equality, tolerance, reason, and individualism. These qualities were to have a significant impact on the future state of Czechoslovakia. The Hussite movement also helped stimulate a national consciousness by encouraging the use of the Czech language in churches, schools, and in public life. Later, during the early nineteenth century the Czechs and Slovaks experienced a revival of that national consciousness which had been badly damaged by the terribly destructive Thirty Years' war (1618-1648). They also began to actively advocate cooperation between all Slavs (including Russians) in cultural, commercial, and political matters. Most importantly, however, for future relations with the Soviet Union, they continued to think of themselves first as Czechs and Slovaks, and secondly as Slavs.

The revolutions of 1848 caused the Habsburg emperor, Francis Joseph, to emancipate all the peasants in the Austro-Hungarian empire and introduce a system of centralized imperial administration. By the 1860s, a limited introduction of civil liberties and self-government were allowed; and by the turn of the century, rapid industrialization and urbanization had produced a large Czech middle and working class, but the Slovaks remained largely a peasant society well into the twentieth century due to the repressive, authoritarian, and still semi-feudal Hungarian government. [Ref. 23]

After World War I, the Czech and Slovak territories were united into the independent state of Czechoslovakia. The new state possessed considerable economic resources and a fairly even balance between those engaged in agriculture, industry, and services, and a pro-Western, democratic vision

of the future. In structuring their new government, the negative experiences the people had had with absolute monarchs led them to place the ultimate source of state power in a strong parliament.

The most decisive factor in Czechoslovak politics was the political parties, which numbered approximately thirty and represented every facet of the ethnic, social, economic, and religious aspects of the population. Only a dozen or so parties obtained enough votes to be represented in the parliament and none were strong enough to rule alone. Fortunately for the country, the governing coalitions were made up of moderate parties and responsible leaders who were willing to search for a workable compromise to their many problems.

The most serious of these problems resulted from the social and economic divisions inherited from the Austro-Hungarian empire. In 1919, the desperate peasants and workers, sometimes influenced by Bolshevik propaganda, took matters in their own hands. The government was able to contain a possible revolution by responding to the need for radical social and economic reforms. The Constitution of 1920 guaranteed its citizens the customary rights of Western democracies, but added some new ones--"the right to work and social insurance,...women's suffrage, protection of marriage, motherhood, and family,...granted the national minorities equality with the Czechs and Slovaks, and guaranteed free development of their cultural institutions...(with) public support for them." [Ref. 24] Thus, Western democratic traditions were firmly rooted in the state of Czechoslovakia from its inception.

When the political leaders realized in 1938 that Hitler fully intended to inflict upon the young state another period of absolute subjugation to German authority, it seems somewhat surprising that President Eduard Benes and the

Czechoslovak citizens did not resist more strongly the dismemberment of their country. For centuries the way of the Czechs and Slovaks had been to mediate between East and West, being located right at the crossroads of the two cultures. They felt that if they had to fight to solve every problem, soon there would be nothing left to fight for. Thus they opted for negotiation whenever possible [Ref. 25]. Benes apparently could not face being responsible for the physical obliteration of his people in a confrontation with the Germans, and he capitulated to Hitler's demands without calling upon the people to resist. He must have reasoned that, as they had many times in the past, so once again would they survive in spite of a new round of foreign occupation.

B. THE GOVERNMENT

In 1945 Czechoslovakia was "liberated" by the Soviet Union. In the eyes of many Czechoslovakians, devastated by the betrayal by France and Great Britain before the war and not understanding the American decision at the end of the war to let the Soviet Union "liberate" Prague, communism and the Soviet Union represented the only guarantee of the safety of their state against a resurgent German threat. Benes returned from exile via Moscow feeling relatively sure that Stalin would honor his wartime promise not to try to communize Czechoslovakia by force. He did not feel that Stalin would risk Russia's newly gained world power status by inviting condemnation of the international community for the invasion or subversion of another state.

These feelings showed how Western-oriented the Czechoslovakians really were and how little they actually understood of the motivations and fears of the Soviet/Russian culture. The Czech way had been negotiation

and survival in spite of foreign control. The Russian way was to build up military security and gain absolute control of neighboring countries to form a buffer zone to prevent a foreign take-over. The Czechs could not know that the Soviet regime felt itself completely surrounded by enemies and that it would not feel safe until the whole world was made up of socialist governments controlled by the Soviet Union. If a government could not be controlled, there was always the possibility that at some point it would turn against them. All the Czechs saw was a geographical situation that put them between Germany on one side and the Soviet Union on the other. The Czechs were as terrified of a rearmed Germany as the Soviets were, but they obviously could not depend upon the Western governments (France, Britain, and the United States) to guarantee their safety. The Soviet Union offered military protection and an ideology that promised a chance for true democratic development and advancement for the "little guy."

Because many Czech intellectuals felt betrayed by the Western Allies, and because they truly believed that Marxism was the way of the future, they collaborated with the Soviets in 1945. By 1948 the Communists had gained sufficient power to set up a take-over of the government when the Ministers of three democratic parties resigned from the parliament in an attempt to force new elections. For a week President Benes resisted the pressure to accept their resignations and appoint Communist-approved replacements. He finally gave in for much the same reasons that he capitulated in 1938: he saw it as the only alternative to a bloody civil war and direct or indirect Soviet intervention to assure the victory of the Communists. [Ref. 26]

By 1968, most of the Czechoslovakian intellectuals and workers who had supported the Communist takeover in 1948 were disillusioned and bitter.

Twenty years ago, when we were twenty, we jumped head first into politics, as though we were jumping into uncharted waters...and we were duly rude and inconsiderate about the hesitation and lack of understanding of older and perhaps more experienced people. We won a great victory. Later many people joined us because they were sympathetic, others from inertia and still others from fear. We did not always recognize and distinguish these motives sensitively enough....A little later, the people who had led us into the struggle left the stage, those with whose names we had linked our successes. This was bad enough in itself, but the real shock came only when we found out that they had been very far from infallible. [Ref. 27]

The statement that the Czechoslovakians thought they were Slavs and found out that they were Westerners is an appropriate description of the times.

Understanding the "Prague Spring" and the events that led up to it are crucial to any estimation of current Czech reliability; therefore, this period will be examined in some detail.

The Communist Party leadership in Czechoslovakia deftly managed to hold off any liberalization of the system after Stalin's death in 1953 until the early sixties. If it were not for the serious area-wide (i.e. Eastern European) economic difficulties, they might have been able to delay it even longer. Almost none of the target figures of the economic plan was reached in 1961, and an acute shortage of commodities of all kinds, reminiscent of the fifties, made it apparent to most leading communists that the Stalinist economic model had outlived its usefulness (if indeed it ever really helped Czechoslovakia). As it was impossible to criticize Stalin's economic model without criticizing his political model also, opposition arose quickly to the dogmatic line in politics, culture, and justice. These opponents received considerable support from the new generation of Party elites, who had no connection with (and thus no responsibility for) the excesses of the Stalin era. Thus the liberalization drive began to gain momentum. [Ref. 28]

The official signal for "destalinization" was given at the Twelfth Congress of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party (CPCS) in December, 1962. As a result several incumbent Party members lost their positions for having been judged responsible for these miscarriages of justice. Among leaders of long standing, only the First Secretary Antonin Novotny was able to keep his functions. The reinstatement of the falsely accused leaders of the fifties proceeded unevenly, and the Slovak Party members became particularly bitter, not only about the refusal to reinstate their leaders (which would have proved extremely embarrassing to Novotny who was responsible for many of their ousters), but also because the Prague Secretariat continued to ignore the ethnic demands of the Slovak people. This proved to be a serious concern for the leadership of the CPCS in succeeding years. After the Twelfth Party Congress, criticism in the press, particularly in cultural and literary reviews, became loud and daring.

Despite all attempts by the regime to curb the criticism, the movement could not be contained, and it eventually led to a wave of liberalization unprecedented in the history of the communist party-state system. It began in January 1968 with the dismissal of Novotny as First Secretary and the transfer of his power to Alexander Dubcek. The difficulty in containing the revisionism in Czech thought stemmed from the fact that the intellectuals expressed the general opinion of all the elites in the society--economists, industrial managers, scientists--as well as that of the noncommunist population.

The intellectuals became the focal point of the opposition because they were very skillful in formulating their ideas and had access to the mass media which would publicize them. A statement from Karel Kosik, a renowned Czech philosopher illustrates the concerns that swept throughout the country in 1967-68:

The root of our political crisis lies in the fact that the citizens of this country no longer want to live as party or non-party masses, without full rights or without any rights at all....the difference between the two systems (i.e. totalitarianism and socialist democracy) is a fundamental one. One is based on the partial or total lack of rights of the party and non-party masses, the other on the equality and full rights of all socialist citizens. [Ref. 29]

Dubcek and his supporters pushed for reforms that would bring more productivity and efficiency to the country, and tried to truly legitimize rule of the Czechoslovak Communist Party; but they also had to deal with the threat of Soviet interference if their reforms went too far. The majority of the people supported continuation of a "socialist" society, (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A) but their idea of socialism was the pre-communist system allowing genuine debate and participation of political parties other than the Communist Party. (See Figure A.2 in Appendix A) Ever mindful of what had happened to Hungary in 1956, the Dubcek government sought to assure the Soviet leadership that they had no plans to deviate from supporting Soviet positions foreign policy matters nor to withdraw from the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Dubcek totally misunderstood the threat that a truly popularly-supported ruling Communist Party with freedom of expression would pose for the Soviet Union and other Eastern European regimes. Popular support would erode the Party's absolute control, and freedom to discuss and question domestic aspects would ultimately lead to a reevaluation of foreign policy, no matter how much the leadership vowed it would not. These were certainly two key elements in the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet invasion in August of 1968 stopped all reforms in mid-step. "Normalization" (the acquiring of legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party after the reimposition of absolute control) has not proceeded well. With the invasion, the Soviet Union destroyed the willing support of

the one true friend they had in Eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia would have voluntarily chosen communism had it been allowed to develop it its own way--precisely what the Soviets could not allow. While Gustav Husak and the current party leadership have succeeded to a degree in providing a prosperous economy and material comforts for the people, they have not succeeded to this day in winning their loyalty.

The Soviets did not realize the true extent of support that existed in the country for Dubcek and the proposed reforms before their invasion. Their intelligence network had been effectively cut off, and there are indications that at the time of the invasion they were relying on the information of the hardliners who had been down-playing the amount of support for the reforms, and were, supposedly, preparing a "request for fraternal assistance." The fact that it took the Soviets seven months to replace Alexander Dubcek with Husak shows that, not finding any way to legally justify their actions, they did not wish to further exacerbate the situation. Figures A.3 and A.4 (see Appendix A) show the extent of support enjoyed by Dubcek during that period.

When Husak did finally take over on 17 April 1969, the speed with which he began to purge the party and the government shocked his supporters. Other drastic actions that he took, such as media control, convinced them that there was no chance for compromise. They then realized that the liberalization would not be allowed to continue in any form; yet despite that realization, organized opposition to Husak's actions appeared on 21 August in the form of a "Ten Point Manifesto." This document rejected Soviet military intervention, threats of purges, censorship, "normalization," etc. It expressed support for human rights, democratic elections, and the right of citizens to disagree with their government. [Ref. 30]

Once it became clear that opposition to the party would not be tolerated, the great majority of the population relapsed into a convenient apolitical mode. In spite of widespread grumbling and anger over inefficient production, corruption and incompetence of the newly imposed managers, there was no sign of a boiling point being reached. While they viewed the government as unfriendly, the relative success of the economy during the normalization years removed the lack of consumer goods as a point of contention. Since it was obvious that they were not to be allowed to have any influence over the workings of the system, the majority reverted to being most concerned about how to make their individual lives better.

On 28 October 1970, the day marking the 52nd anniversary of the foundation of the independent Czechoslovakian state in 1918, the "Socialist Movement of Czechoslovak Citizens" issued its first manifesto. The authors asked the citizens not to close themselves off from their fellow citizens nor to become victims of cynicism and apathy. In December 1971 and January 1972 some 200 people were arrested and during the following summer ten political trials were held. The fact that the Movement was not able to mobilize opposition to the trials showed how effectively the mixture of coercion and material comfort had been in convincing the people not to support what they felt to be a lost cause. That did not mean, however, that "normalization" was working or that Czechoslovak reliability had increased.

By 1974, the initial economic successes had begun to wear off and the traditional problems of a centrally planned economy began to reassert themselves. At the end of the year a half-hearted attempt was made to "increase efficiency," because of the fear of another round of demands for liberalization if measures were not taken. The results were negligible. On the whole, however, since the people were

still working. (in spite of significantly lower worker productivity), and goods were still generally available (even if the quality was not up to international standards as before), the demands for reform remained low-keyed. The regime still had to contend, though, with the underlying levels of frustration felt by an increasing number of people who had sufficient savings to buy washing machines, refrigerators, cars, and take holidays in Bulgaria. These people were experiencing the "rising expectations" syndrome. They wanted automatic washing machines, freezers, Western cars, and Western holidays, like their counterparts in Western countries. The danger was still there that if the government did not eventually satisfy these desires, the people would become "political" again. [Ref. 31]

Again in 1977 it seems that the intellectuals who formulated Charter 77 were trying to harness some of those underlying frustrations to produce a new wave of demands, albeit less strident than in 1968, for the respect of human rights in Czechoslovakia as affirmed in the Helsinki Accord of 1975. Charter 77 itself was a combination of a statement, a petition, and a declaration of intent to be delivered to the government, the Federal Assembly, and the Czechoslovak Press Agency. These copies were confiscated by the police prior to their delivery, but a copy did make it to the Western press. It was signed by 242 individuals who maintained their intention was to "discharge their civic duties" in five ways: by focusing attention on the infringement of human rights in Czechoslovakia, by documenting such grievances; by suggesting remedies; by making general proposals to strengthen rights and freedoms and the mechanisms designed to protect them; and by acting as intermediaries in situations of conflict. The fact that the authors of the Charter kept its formulations strictly within the law of the land so that the regime could not find any pretext for

interpreting it as illegal has been a sore point for many years. The core of the Charter is the upholding of all laws, including international commitments. [Ref. 32]. The main characteristics of Charter 77 are as follows:

1. No new protests were introduced; it summarized and generalized those that had been made before.
2. It focused on human rights, one of the key problems in "normalized" Czechoslovakia, rather than on the whole gamut of economic, political, and cultural issues.
3. It neither endorses nor condemns socialism.
4. It questions the right of Party apparatchiks to issue orders binding on non-party citizens outside and above the legal framework.

The Charter was signed by people from all walks of life and all political persuasions, except, of course, loyal supporters of the incumbent regime. By the end of 1977, the number of signatories had risen to over 800. Among the first 242, intellectuals, most of whom had been victims of the purges and subsequent discrimination, predominated. Among the later signatories, three categories of supporters were noted: workers, young people, and those who had been only marginally or not at all affected by discrimination. The widespread anti-Charter campaign showed that the government realized that the opposition to the regime was not dead, and that that sentiment could coalesce at some inopportune moment producing again the widespread support for liberalization that the regime faced in 1968, further exasperating the Soviets.

And now, seven years after Charter 77 and fifteen years after the Soviet invasion, what is the status of relations between the Communist Party and the people, and the Communist Party and the Soviet Union? Obviously intellectual opposition is not dead; but with the tight media

control in Czechoslovakia, it is unlikely that inflammatory issues filter down to the public at large, which continues to be more concerned with improving its material condition than with risking the loss of what it has gained by publically opposing the current regime. However, the continued existence of what Jane Leftwich Curry calls the "initiation mode" of media control (i.e. a prepublication check to ensure the "correctness" of the author's views) indicates that the Soviets are still not sure that fifteen years of indoctrination have taken hold. They recognize that there are still large gaps between what the people expect and what they actually get, both economically and politically. [Ref. 33]

As far as relations with the Soviet Union go, since the normalization began, Czech foreign policy has been totally subordinated to Soviet foreign aims. From 1969 to 1978, Vladimir Kusin finds "not a single instance of deviation on record or even reluctance to perform as expected." [Ref. 34] Prague was chosen as the host to various international conferences from 1970 to 1977 (21 to be exact) at which the Moscow line was promoted to delegates from communist parties all over the world. Czechoslovak leaders and propagandists became the most ardent supporters of proletarian internationalism and the leading critics of Eurocommunism. [Ref. 35] This slavish conformity notwithstanding, it is a sure bet that the Soviets do not trust the people of Czechoslovakia to remain quiescent forever, and that they will keep a close eye on the ability of the current leadership to maintain control.

C. THE MILITARY

The armed forces of Czechoslovakia are among the most modern and technologically advanced in the Warsaw Treaty

Organization. Czechoslovakia also has an active domestic arms industry and supplies both other WTO members and "progressive" Third World countries, and is a key element in the Soviet security system.

The military has a proud history, dating from the accomplishments of the Czechoslovak Legion in World War I whose reputation certainly influenced the decision to grant the territory independence from Austria-Hungary. In World War II Czechoslovak soldiers fought bravely as individuals with the Allies on both fronts. Curiously, though, during the three crises of the modern state--1938, 1948, 1968--the military did not lift a finger to protect it. They remained confined to their barracks during the confrontations. Czechoslovakia is crucial to the WTO and the Soviet Union, both economically and geographically. In view of the resentment towards the Soviets in the population at large (from which the military is drawn) because of the occupation of their country and the reimposition of Stalinist-type economic and political controls, can the Soviets depend on the military to remain neutral during future internal crises, and, more importantly for this analysis, can they rely on the military to fight wholeheartedly in case of a war with NATO?

In order to evaluate that question, one must first examine the three periods of Czechoslovak military history in which they did nothing to defend the national interests of the state--1938, 1948, and 1968. What was the attitude of the armed forces in 1938 when President Benes decided not to resist Hitler? Would they have fought to defend their country's freedom had they been called upon to do so?

Based on the outstanding performance of the Czechoslovak Legions in World War I, and the pride that the people of Czechoslovakia felt in their newly won independence, it seems highly likely that the military would have resisted

had they been called upon [Ref. 36]. That they were willing and ready to fight is supported even by statements from President Benes' himself. He stated in his memoirs that in 1935, the Czechoslovak military held its first large scale maneuvers, with a delegation from the Soviet Union participating; and 1936 and 1937 saw "practical co-operation in the sphere of aviation, armaments, and the mutual exchange of political and military information" between the Czechs and the Soviets. And in May of 1938, the Czechoslovak military was mobilized [Ref. 37]. Thus it appears to have been a political decision, consistent with Czechoslovak political culture, and not a lack of willingness to fight on the part of the military which resulted in their nonparticipation in the German takeover.

When Benes returned from exile after World War II, he believed both intellectually (based on the "betrayal" by the West and the cooperation begun by the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1935) and pragmatically (in view of the "liberation" by the Soviets and their continuing efforts to undermine democratic elements in the country) that alliance with the Soviet Union was the best way to guarantee the security and independence of his country. The Kosice Program (April 1945) was the instrument drawn up to implement those beliefs. The military clause is of the most interest here. It pledged complete cooperation with the Red Army and absolute adherence to the Soviet model of structuring its armed forces.

Since the communists were not in complete control at this time, the democratic forces in the country attempted to balance communist influence by insisting that pro-Western officers hold top-level key military positions [Ref. 38]. The officer corps that resulted from trying to satisfy both forces was quite varied--"bourgeois" according to the communists, since only 605 were members of the Party--and in 1946

the Party insisted on a "review" of its membership to weed out "Nazi collaborators."

Prime Minister Klement Gottwald and the Communist Party were not satisfied with the results and took their own steps to change the composition. First, twenty military and pre-military schools staffed by Soviet instructors, were opened and Gottwald personally appealed to the working-class and peasant families to enroll their sons in reserve officer training programs. By 1947 there were over 5000 students in these schools. Second, an exchange program was initiated between Soviet and Czechoslovak officers, with selected officers being sent to the Soviet Union for advanced military study. Third, officers of air and air-support units of the Czechoslovak First Army Corps³ replaced strongly pro-Western Air Force officers, even though the First Army officers' experience in air warfare was limited. The Communist Party proudly proclaimed that by 1948 there were 3000 loyal Party members among the officer corps and that about one-third of the officers that had been reinstated after World War II had left or had been replaced. Thus the foundation of a loyal officer cadre was built. [Ref. 39]

Despite the success of these efforts, at the time of the February 1948 Communist take-over, pro-Western officers still controlled most of the top-level positions, and the military was called upon by neither side during the crisis. They remained, as previously mentioned, confined to their barracks. Would the armed forces have resisted in 1948 had they been called upon? The army's intelligence network had been almost completely infiltrated by the KGB and communication between officers who would have resisted was seriously restricted, but theoretically it was still possible

³After Hitler's invasion, many Czechoslovak military members made their way to various allied fronts to fight the Nazis. The First Army Corps was made up of men who fought in the Soviet Union under the leadership of the Russians.

[Ref. 40]. Had resistance occurred spontaneously, it would have strengthened Benes' resolve to stand up to the Communists and call for new elections rather than accede to their power grab. But Czechoslovak military tradition does not seem to include action independent from political instructions. And, having given in in 1938, it is unlikely that Benes ever seriously thought of calling upon the army to take a stand that would most likely have resulted in a bloody civil war. And since it is not the Czechoslovak military style to intervene on their own, the army once again remained neutral (or neutralized).

In 1950 Alexander Cepicka, Gottwald's son-in-law, was appointed Minister of Defense. (He was a party apparachik who had never held military rank.) Tremendous resources were expended on the military and Cepicka transformed it into an efficient, trustworthy organization numbering around 250,000. Political education classes were instituted. New military academies staffed by Soviet officers were opened and more officers were sent to the Soviet Union for training. The arms industries were revitalized, and by the end of the 1950s Czechoslovakia was virtually self-sufficient in artillery and small arms. The Soviets considered the Czechoslovak military reliable enough in 1955 to allow them to pursue Soviet interests in the Third World--such as on-site training of "progressive" militaries and effecting arms transfers to various countries, notably Egypt in 1955. [Ref. 41]

With the development of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in 1955, the Czechoslovak military went from obvious dependence on the Soviet Union to participation in a military alliance in which it played an integral role. The Czechoslovak military was given a defined mission important to Soviet theater defense. Consistent with the Soviet concept of mobile defense, the Czechoslovaks were originally

assigned the wartime responsibility of contributing one operational group of armies which would fall under Soviet command. When the Soviet doctrine shifted around 1960 to a nuclear strategy, however, the Czechoslovak forces (consisting of ten divisions) were "to form the first echelon of a southwestern front which was to operate along the axis Pilsen-Karlsruhe, and eventually reach the Rhein at the latter city." [Ref. 42] In addition to the mission, the domestic armament industries began developing more sophisticated weaponry, including a new jet trainer, which brought it considerable prestige.

After the NATO adoption of the "flexible response" doctrine, resulting in the subsequent shift in Soviet doctrine to include the possibility of a conventional phase to warfare in Europe, the Czechoslovak military training was also modified to reflect these changes. At this time, the mid-1960s, initial cautious attempts were initiated to differentiate Czech military doctrine and organization from the Soviet model. While there were two primary factors influencing this development (resentment of the complete Soviet domination of the WTO and the insistence that all member states subscribe exactly to Soviet defense concepts regardless of national requirements, and the concern over the potential impact on Czechoslovak security of the Soviet reappraisal of the possibility of a limited war in Europe), the likely catalyst for the rethinking of the defense problems in Czechoslovakia may have been the Romanians' questioning of Soviet intentions in 1963. [Ref. 43]

The government of Romania agreed to permit joint WTO exercises to be conducted on its territory in 1962 and 1963. After that it refused absolutely to allow any other exercises to be held there. While the details of these exercises are not known, assuming they were similar to the exercises conducted in Bulgaria (the only other WTO member

without Soviet troops on its territory which had a coast on the Black Sea and mountainous and forested areas) in 1964 and 1967, Romanian reluctance would be understandable. A Soviet-Bulgarian study on the 1967 exercises indicated that the maneuvers included a "defensive" battle by air and naval forces and airborne troops for the seizure of the sea coast and actions in the forest and mountain areas.

If the exercises in Romania included these same elements, it is likely that the Romanians' reasoned that the primary purpose for the exercises was not preparation for a war with NATO but the restriction of their capability to resist a Soviet invasion (vis-a-vis Hungary in 1956). Additionally, the study revealed a method of operations which, if used in the exercises in Romania, would have further degraded Romanian attempts to evaluate the capabilities of its own forces; i.e., the "mutual exchange of groups and representatives among the units and formations of various countries." [Ref. 44] (A more detailed description of Czechoslovak activities within the WTO will be presented in the following section.)

Another factor contributing to the rethinking of Czechoslovakia's role in the WTO was the increasing awareness of the diminishing German threat--always a pivotal determinant in Czechoslovak military policy. Views expressed by military researchers on this subject were often said to conflict with the official position of the Novotny government. Then in 1963 with the publication of the second edition of Sokolovsky's Military Strategy, the Czechoslovak military leadership realized that if a limited war occurred in Europe, they would be sacrificed in the first few days. WTO operational plans estimated the losses for the southwestern front to be between 60 and 70 percent. By 1967 expressions of disenchantment with this situation had become widespread within the military, extending probably to the top leadership. [Ref. 45]

Surprisingly enough, the dissatisfaction resulted in some practical attempts to correct the situation. As early as 1965 Czechoslovak military researchers developed a new model of command structure and management of the armed forces, which presumably reflected nationalistic concerns and, implicitly, anti-Soviet tendencies, with the military professionals seeking ways to limit the pervasive Party control of the armed forces [Ref. 46].

By 1967 the previously apolitical military was beginning to get actively involved in the demand for liberalization that was beginning to sweep the country. The catalyst for this involvement appears to have been an alleged attempt by top level politicians (Maj. Gen. Jan Sejna, secretary of the Party Collective of Communists in the Armed Forces, and the ambitious Gen. Vladimir Janko, deputy minister of Defense) to use the military to support the tottering leadership of Antonin Novotny in December 1967 (not to stage a coup). Unscheduled, rare winter maneuvers took place immediately preceding the Central Committee Plenum at which Novotny's continued leadership was to be discussed. Supposedly a letter was to be delivered to the Central Committee from the Presidium of the Party in the Armed Forces, headed by Sejna, supporting Novotny's conservative position; but it arrived after the vote had been taken to oust Novotny. Reportedly this maneuver failed because Maj. Gen. Vaclav Prchlik, chief of the Main Political Administration, alerted the anti-Novotny forces on the Central Committee. [Ref. 47]

As Alexander Dubcek assumed the role of First Secretary in January 1968, the Czechoslovak search for their own national defense doctrine became the subject of public discussions. In mid-April, 1968, Col. Vojtech Mencl, rector of the Klement Gottwald Military-Political Academy in Prague, and several of his colleagues began to review Czechoslovak strategic doctrine. They concluded it was not

suitable for their needs because it allowed the commander of the WTO to determine the strategic role and tactical functions of the Czechoslovak armed forces. They wanted to revise this doctrine to allow them to deal with the Soviet Union as an ally rather than as a subordinate. In other words they wanted the Czechoslovak army under Czechoslovak command. In May they produced a 100-page document entitled "On the Action Program of the Czechoslovak People's Army." It recommended that membership in the WTO continue to be the basis for its strategy, but listed five other alternatives that the political/military leadership might wish to consider:

1. (Acting within) the framework of the Warsaw Pact, but with imminent prospects of its bilateral or unilateral abolition.
2. Safeguarding the security of the state within the framework of its territory or of neutral policies.
3. Initiating proposals for disarmament measures.
4. The creation of conditions that will ensure security in Europe by means of a European regional collective security organization.
5. Contingent planning for self-defense relying on our own means. [Ref. 48]

It is virtually certain that the Soviets knew about this document.

In July 1968, a most alarming development (to the Soviets) occurred with the publication of the "Gottwald Memorandum," which questioned the rationale behind the WTO, implying that the NATO threat was overstated, and suggested that Czechoslovak interests would be better served by analyzing issues on a geopolitical rather than class basis [Ref. 49]. An analyst from the subsequent Husak regime quoted the Memorandum as suggesting three ways in which Czechoslovakia could pursue military security:

1. The coalition principle (an alliance with the Soviet Union and other states of the Warsaw Pact) on which our defensive system is based is subject to development, and it is necessary to reconsider its validity in the coming 10 to 15 years.
2. It is possible to think about co-ordinated defense in Central Europe without the military potential of the USSR (some kind of military equivalent to the political Little Entente 'in a socialist form' or some form of regional collective security organizations without class determination).
3. The possibility of neutralizing one's own means of defense. [Ref. 50]

To top that off, two weeks later Gen. Prchlik gave a press conference at which he openly stated to the Czechoslovak public that perhaps membership in the WTO was not as equal as it should be ("relations... should be improved in such a way as to emphasize the real equality of individual members...so that every member of this coalition can really assert itself.") [Ref. 51] Then making bad matters even worse, the Ministry of Defense delayed two full weeks before disavowing that statement in principle. Certainly this loss of control by the conservatives within the Czechoslovak military contributed to the Soviet decision to invade. [Ref. 52]

The August invasion terminated all reforms and reestablished party control over the military, reinforced by a strong Soviet presence. At the beginning of the invasion the armed forces were disarmed and restricted to their barracks. The Soviets then occupied the best military installations forcing the Czechoslovak units to camp out until new accommodations could be built. A shadow General Staff manned by Soviet officers took over the daily

management of the armed forces, and then assumed control of all important positions in the Czechoslovak Ministry of Defense. Czechoslovak military officials were not allowed to function in their official capacities. [Ref. 53]

In order to reestablish Party control in the armed forces, it was necessary to rescind some 1,515 military-related decisions and resolutions made during Dubcek's rule [Ref. 54]. Some 17,000 officers were suspected of being sympathetic to the reform movement, but to eliminate that many would likely have meant the total disintegration of the armed forces. Even so, some 11,000 officers and 30,000 noncommissioned officers were removed from the service during that period. Another extremely serious problem was the voluntary mass resignations of officers. In 1969, some 57.8% of all officers under the age of 30 left, and 50% of the students in the military academies resigned by June 1969. [Ref. 55]

The repercussions of the invasion are still being felt today. A drastic shortage of command personnel is still evident, and the military has difficulty recruiting young men. They also encounter difficulties in interesting career officers in Party membership, despite the benefits that go along with it. The plain fact is that the failure of the armed forces to resist the Soviet invasion destroyed the prestige of the military in the eyes of the average citizen. The old image of being subservient to an imposed ruler (first the Emperor, then the Soviets), expensive, and useless in defending the nation was reinforced [Ref. 56]. Obviously, the Soviet confidence in the reliability of the Czechoslovak armed forces dropped sharply after 1968.

A brief examination of the following questions should allow us to make a more accurate estimate of their current usefulness to the Soviets:

1. What is the current mission of the Czechoslovak military within the WTO?
2. How much new military equipment/weapons systems have the Soviets provided the Czechoslovak armed forces since 1968?
3. In view of the highly developed armaments industry in Czechoslovakia, what equipment have the Soviets licensed for production there and what Czechoslovak-developed equipment is used throughout the WTO?
4. Do specialized units, such as airborne troops, exist in Czechoslovakia? (These units play a special, critical role in Soviet plans to seize the initiative in a war with NATO. They will be dropped behind enemy lines to disrupt NATO mobilization and/or movement in the first crucial hours of the attack.)

Among the most substantive measures of the decline in the trustworthiness of the Czechoslovak military from the Soviet viewpoint is the downgrading of their mission in the WTO. They are still to be used in a southwestern front; however, they are now directly subordinate to a Soviet commander and Soviet units will be fighting alongside them. In view of the lessening of hostility between the Germans and Czechoslovakians and the general lack of enthusiasm for the Soviets and their methods, it is likely that the Soviets would prefer to put their own troops (i.e. the Central Group of Forces) against the American and German forces (reputed to be the best in NATO) and keep the Czechoslovak troops well in the rear in support positions.

Another way of looking at the Soviets' decision to let the Czechoslovak troops form the leading edge of the southwestern front by themselves was the fact that there were no Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia before 1968, which

gave the Soviets little option in the matter. Since the troops on this front would bear the brunt of the first confrontation with American and West German troops, they would most likely suffer heavy casualties, ridding the Soviet Union of much potential opposition in the aftermath of the war. This idea of being used as "cannon fodder" was discussed among the top echelons of Czechoslovak military thinkers in the early 1960s when they were attempting to develop their own military doctrine. There was, however, no doubt that Soviet confidence in the Czechoslovak military plunged after the 1968 Prague Spring. Putting Czechoslovak units side by side with Soviet units is probably an indication that not only can they not be trusted to wholeheartedly carry out an offensive against the Western forces, but that the Soviets would also not want them to be left alone in the rear.

Just how well equipped is the Czechoslovak military and at what junctures did the Soviets introduce newer weapons? Table I gives a comparison of equipment available from 1964-1983. Before the 1968 invasion, the Czechoslovak military was considered to be one of the best in Eastern Europe, particularly the air force. The armed forces lost over 40,000 men as a result of the purges after 1968, and as the statistics indicate, there was no modernization of any kind until 1972 when the T-62 medium tank was added to the inventory, along with three helicopter models. That year there was a significant upgrading of the ground defenses with the introduction of the Frog and Scud surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) and the anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW) Snapper, Swatter, and Sagger. This was not, however, an indication of returning trust in the Czechoslovak military because these same weapons were simultaneously introduced in the two other Northern Tier states of Poland and East Germany. By 1974/75 the Soviets had introduced the MiG-23

Flogger B (replacement for the MiG-21 with the capability to track and engage targets flying below its own altitude) to Czechoslovakia, and in 1977, they began installing their mobile surface-to-air missiles (SAM), the SA-3, 4, and 6. This was again a part of an overall upgrading of the air defense capabilities of the Northern Tier.

The state of the Czechoslovak armed forces in 1984 has to be considered among the best of the WTO [Ref. 57]. They have large numbers of T-54/55 tanks, 100 T-62 and T-72 tanks, and a variety of armored vehicles including the BMP-1 (to be discussed further below) and the SAU-122, a fully-tracked, amphibious, 22-ton self-propelled artillery piece.⁴

Another factor reflecting a degree of trust in a WTO member is permission to build, or develop for organization-wide use, (and for export) certain pieces of military equipment. Table II indicates which countries have been allowed to produce which equipment. (This list is not comprehensive and does not reflect small arms.) The only relatively heavy and modern pieces authorized for production outside of the Soviet Union are the T-72 medium tank and the newest armored personnel carrier, BMP-1,⁵ which some Western commentators consider to be the finest infantry fighting vehicle in the world [Ref. 58]. The list of authorized equipment would hardly allow any build-up of a national armed force apart from Soviet control. They have made sure that their clients remain dependent on them for the bulk of the heavy weapons and new technology. Thus the degree of trust expressed in Czechoslovakia through its arms production is minimal.

⁴It has a rate of fire of eight rounds per minute with a range of 9-15 miles and a top speed of 60 kms. per hour. Its cruising range is 310 miles.

⁵It has a 73mm. gun able to fire low-velocity, rocket-assisted rounds to engage hard and soft targets.

TABLE I
Czechoslovakia Military Force/Equipment 1964-1983

YEAR	64/65	67/68	71/72	74/75
Pop. (in millions)	14	14.25	14.5	14.7
Tot. Mil force	180,000	225,000	185,000	200,000

Equipment:

Tanks	3,000 (T-10, T-54)	3,200 (T-54, T-55)	3,500 (T-54, 55, 62)	3,500 (same)
Acft	700 (MiG-15, 17,	600 (same + Su-7)	504 (same +	500
Mi-1,	{same + 19, 21; Il-11, 4, 8) 14, 28		MiG-23)	
SSM/SAM/ SSMs	unidentified same		SA-2	added
AAM/ATGW	SAMS		Frog, Scud, and ATGWs Snapper, Swat- ter, Sagger	

Airborne troops	-----	-----	1 brigade	same
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YEAR	77/78	80/81	82/83
Pop. (in millions)	14.9	15.4	15.45
Tot. Mil. force	181,000	195,000	196,500

Equipment:

Tanks	3,400 (same)	3,400 (same + T-72)	3,400 (same)
Acft	558 (same)	471 (same)	471 (same + 12 armed helicopters)
SSM/SAM/ AAM/ATGW	+ SA-3, 4, 6	(same)	+ ATGW Spigot
Airborne troops	1 regiment	same	1 brigade

Source: The Military Balance, International Institute for
Strategic Studies, London

TABLE II
Equipment Licensed for Production Outside the USSR

ITEM	LICENSED FOR PRCDUTION IN	PRODUCED FOR WTO BY
MiG-17 PF (interceptor)	Czechoslovakia	
MiG-21F	Czechoslovakia	
L-29/39 (trainer acft.)		Czechoslo- vakia
TS-11 (Iskra) (trainer acft.)		Poland
LI-2 CAB (med. transport acft.)	Poland	
IL-14/14M (me. transport acft.)	Czechoslovakia, Poland, GDR	
L-60 (utility aircraft)		Czechoslo- vakia
PZL-104 (utility aircraft)		Poland
Mi-1 (SM-1/2) (helicopter)	Poland	
HC-4 (utility helicopter)	Czechoslovakia, Poland	
ASU-57/85 (Airborne assault gun)	Poland	
WP-8Z (Rocker launcher)	Poland	
T-72 (medium tank)	Czechoslovakia, Poland*	
OT-62/64 (Armored personnel carrier)	Czechoslovakia, Poland	
BMP-1 (replacement for OT-62/64)	Czechoslovakia, Poland*	

Sources: Friedrich Wiener, The Armies of the Warsaw Pact Nations, 2nd edition, 1978, p. 16.

* James R. Carlton, "Soviet and Warsaw Pact Major Battlefield Weapons," The Warsaw Pact: Political Purposes and Military Means, 1982, pp. 171, 175.

The existence of specialized units, such as airborne units or amphibious assault units, could indicate a degree of trust, in at least the members of such a unit, because of its special mission. According to Friedrich Wiener,

Special airborne units of Warsaw Pact armies have general missions of reconnaissance and sabotage, as well as tactical missions of destroying or securing bridges or single targets behind enemy lines. In preparation for large air-landing operations, these units might be used to capture needed airports by surprise in special operations similar to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It has been confirmed that the special airborne units of the East German, Polish, and Czechoslovak armies conduct training exercises wearing the uniforms of the West German Bundeswehr, the Danish Army, the British Army of the Rhine and the U.S. 7th Army. Hand in hand with this is special language training and comprehensive learning of the inner workings of these armies. [Ref. 59]

Supposedly an elite unit exists near Holesov which is staffed exclusively by volunteers [Ref. 60]. One can be sure that the Soviets screened each member intensively before allowing them to participate in such a sensitive mission. The degree of confidence in this unit in a war with NATO would have to be higher than in the overall army, but one could surmise the Soviets might still prefer to use them in less crucial missions.

Taken together these four aspects (the mission, equipment, licensing procedures, and the existence of an airborne unit) provide a mixed picture of reliability which seems rather accurate. The Soviets, for their own reasons, have felt a need to upgrade the overall military capabilities of the WTO Nations, especially the Northern Tier, and have taken advantage of the high stage of development of the armament industry in Czechoslovakia, thus giving an appearance of increased trust in its "ally." However, as in practically every other aspect of Soviet life, particularly the international one, political considerations take precedence

over everything. The situation in Czechoslovakia is quiescent, but the spirit of loyalty is not there, and the Soviets know it. As long as it takes the physical presence (or threat of renewed occupation should they ever decide to withdraw their forces) or the imposition of a rigid political control system to ensure loyalty, the Soviets are not likely to have much confidence in Czechoslovakian willingness to fight wholeheartedly for the Soviets in war.

D. CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN THE WTO

The extent of participation in the Warsaw Treaty Organization gives us one last angle from which to examine the reliability of the Czechoslovak armed forces from the Soviet viewpoint.

Czechoslovakia participated in 25 WTO exercises from 1961-1979 (9 from 1961-1968 and 16 from 1968-1979). In 1962 there was a joint ground forces/combined arms exercise involving Czech, Soviet, and Polish troops on Czechoslovak territory; in 1964 there were two exercises, both in Czechoslovakia--one involving Czech, Polish, and Soviet troops, the other involving Soviet and Czech command staffs. In 1966 the Vltava exercises were conducted on Czechoslovak soil involving Czech, East German, Hungarian, and Soviet forces. This exercise served as preparation for an even larger exercise in 1968 which provided the perfect cover for the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Polish, East German, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Soviet troops. During the same time period (1961-1968), Czech troops participated in two other exercises held in another country and three held jointly in Czechoslovakia and another country [Ref. 61].

There was a common pattern in the staging of these exercises. Approximately one-third on home territory, one-third

on foreign territory, and one-third jointly on home and foreign territory. The same pattern occurred in the assignment of exercise commanders. One-third of the time national armed forces were commanded by their own officers and two-thirds of the time they were commanded by foreign officers [Ref. 62]. (See Figure 1.2) The Czech experience deviated from this pattern before 1968 and conformed to it after the Soviet invasion.

Prior to 1968, half of the exercises (8) took place in Czechoslovakia, two took place outside the country, one took place jointly on Czechoslovak and Hungarian territory, and one jointly on Czechoslovak, GDR, Polish, and Soviet territory. After the invasion in 1968 and the establishment of the Soviet Central Group of Forces, the pattern of exercises coincided with that of the three other states with Soviet troops. [Ref. 63]

The question is why were there more exercises in Czechoslovakia during the 1961-1968 period? Czechoslovakia was considered a reliable ally until 1960, evidenced by the type of weaponry it was producing and its activity in Third World areas of Soviet interest. It seems likely that by 1963/64 the Soviet information network was picking up signs of disaffection and national initiative among Czech intellectuals (destalinization) and military leaders (vis-a-vis independent national defense doctrine) and, wanting to avoid another situation such as the one that occurred in Hungary in 1956, they decided to take precautionary steps to forestall any problems. Since there were no Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia the frequent exercises there served not only to familiarize Soviet and WTO troops with the area, but placed them conveniently within striking distance should intervention be necessary.

By the 1980s, the Soviets had turned the WTO into a highly integrated body with modern, conventional military

forces. Since the mid-1970s there has been an increase in the bilateral cooperation between Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the GDR in which the Soviets are only minimally, if at all, involved. This includes such things as officer exchanges for advanced military study (e.g. Polish officers attending the GDR's Friedrich Engels Military Academy) and training exercises for the three countries without the presence of Soviet military units. This training enhances the ability of these troops to operate independently of Soviet troops in rear areas or on a separate front. This somewhat unusual activity could be viewed as a sign of confidence in the Northern Tier countries, since it obviously could not occur without the approval of the Soviet Union; however, in view of the political situation in Czechoslovakia and that in Poland, even maneuvers with Soviet approval are likely to be viewed with caution and efforts to control the type of cooperation could be expected. [Ref. 64]

E. CZECHOSLOVAK PARTICIPATION IN COMECON

Czechoslovakia was one of the original members of COMECON, having been pressured by Stalin to reject Marshall Plan aid. It was a highly industrialized country prior to World War II and still had many of its industrial assets intact after the war. In accordance with the Stalinist model, industrial investments were given priority, and the economy grew steadily until 1975. At that point, the inefficiencies inherent in a centrally planned economy, accentuated by the energy crisis and the recession in the West, began to assert themselves.

One problem was the high energy and material inputs required for a unit of industrial output. In the mid-1970s Czechoslovak machinery often weighed double comparable Western equipment and was usually 20% less productive.

Export prices of Czechoslovak machinery dropped sharply on the world markets because of small deficiencies in performance and lack of reliable parts and service after the sale. Additionally, export sales to the Soviet Union require the best of the Czechoslovak machinery, leaving older or less productive equipment for the domestic industry. This does not aid in improving production or conserving energy. [Ref. 65]

Other criticisms range from producing too broad a range of machinery instead of specializing, problems with design limitations, and the long period of time required to complete investment projects. Construction time was often double and sometimes triple that required in the West, freezing funds for inordinate amounts of time and making some equipment nearly obsolete before it was completed. Old equipment is retired slowly. In 1976 some one-third of the equipment was over fifteen years old, with some pieces dating back to pre-World War II. Unfortunately the planners' ability to correct deficiencies in the industrial sector is somewhat limited because machinery is the country's main export. [Ref. 66]

In 1960 Czechoslovakia depended on coal for 88% of its energy consumption. By 1975 it was down to 75% because of growing oil imports. By 1977 it was down further to 62% in spite of an increased emphasis on coal to combat rising oil prices. Energy requirements were just increasing faster than coal output. This increasing need was met primarily by oil and natural gas imports. By 1979 oil imports were up 90% over 1970 and gas was up 440%. The refinery capacity had to be expanded to accommodate this increase, and all but a small percent of the refined crude oil was consumed domestically. Since the Soviet Union supplied 95% of Czechoslovakia's gas and oil imports, when the prices were almost doubled in 1975, significant pressure was placed on

their economy. Nevertheless, in 1980, a Czechoslovak official estimated that they were still paying one-fourth the world prices for oil imports. [Ref. 67]

It became evident that a coordinated energy policy was necessary, though, and in the 1970s a short- and long-term policy was established. Conservation was to be essential in the 1980s because, while the supply of Soviet natural gas was expected to increase, the supply of oil was expected to be held at levels around that of 1975. In the short run, domestic coal would help meet the energy demands, but the increase would be slow and costly since most veins were deep deposits. In the long run, the plan was to rely on nuclear energy.

As part of the "Concerted Plan of Multilateral Integration Measures" previously mentioned, Czechoslovakia was to supply reactors and other equipment for use domestically and by other COMECON members in the production of nuclear power plants. In late 1978, the first major nuclear power plant began operation at Jaslovské Bohunice, at least a year behind schedule. By 1980 it accounted for 6% of the total electricity supplied, and should increase to about 13% by 1985. If the schedule is maintained, by 1990 expansion of this power station, construction of additional stations, and the import of electricity from joint nuclear projects in the Soviet Union will account for about 30% of total electrical supply. [Ref. 68]

Czechoslovakia has long been known for its conservative fiscal policy. The statistics indicate that it maintained trade surplus with all its trade partners as late as 1960, and by 1976 it still maintained an overall trade surplus, although it was running a rather hefty negative balance with industrialized Western countries. 1977, however, was a different story. For the first time, Czechoslovakia ran an overall deficit; and by 1978, that deficit had increased by

155%. It began running a deficit both with the COMECON countries (particularly the Soviet Union) and the industrialized West.

In November 1980, the U.S. Department of Commerce reported that both nuclear and coal-mining programs were already behind schedule and the energy conservation efforts had produced only minimal results [Ref. 69]. A similar report in May, 1983, indicated that construction on the second site, and possibly expansion work on the first, was suffering from labor shortages and supply delays and was lagging nearly a year behind schedule [Ref. 70]. The statistics also conclude that Czechoslovakia is increasingly directing its trade toward the Soviet Union and the COMECON countries and away from the West in accordance with its cautious fiscal policy. Certainly another factor in the latter development is that since 1968 Czechoslovakia has tended to follow the Soviet policy line more slavishly than other countries, and with the increasing chill in US-USSR relations, a move away from the West could be expected.

One final comment must be made. Economic analyst Jan Vanous estimated the total Czechoslovak trade deficit in 1979 to be about 2.8 billion dollars at world market prices and in 1980 about 4.2 billion dollars. However, at least 60% of that figure is covered by implicit Soviet subsidies on exports of fuels and non-food raw materials. This does not increase their external debt, but it makes Czechoslovakia more politically and economically beholden to the Soviet Union than ever. [Ref. 71]

III. THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

A. THE GERMAN POLITICAL CULTURE

The origins of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) go back to 1946 when Stalin made it clear that the Soviet Union intended to permanently retain influence in the postwar development of Germany. The Soviet Military Administration began expropriating the holdings of leading Nazis and war criminals and nationalizing the heavy industry (what was left of it after massive dismantling as reparation for Soviet losses during the war) in 1946. Later that year, the Soviets forced the merger between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Communist Party (KPD) resulting in the establishment of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) which was under complete Communist (i.e. Soviet) control [Ref. 72]. These actions spurred the Western Allies into implementing the European Recovery Plan (i.e. the Marshall Plan) in 1947, and they offered to extend its aid to Germany.

In June 1948, Stalin halted all Allied ground access to Berlin for 11 months, hoping to prove to the Allies that Berlin was indefensible and to make them withdraw. The blockade did not work. When the Allies subsequently asked the West Germans to set up a government of their own to include the three Western occupation zones (culminating in the Basic Law, completed in May 1949), Stalin swung into action, determined that if he could not succeed in getting a neutralized Germany (which he hoped would ultimately fall under Communist control, directly or indirectly), at least he would prevent the resurgence of a united Germany.

Therefore, in October 1949, he announced the formal existence of the German Democratic Republic.

It is not enough, however, to just examine the relations between the government, people, and the Soviet Union from 1949 on because the people, before they are East Germans, are first Germans. In order to assess their current reliability as a Soviet ally, one must compare the historical differences and similarities between the two cultures.

The German tribes inherited the traditions of the Holy Roman Empire and the legacy of Charlemagne, and were, from the tenth to the twelfth centuries, the only element of stability in northern and central Europe. After driving the Nordic invaders back and stopping Slavic raids in the east, the Germanic tribes formed a strong union with the Papacy and established peace in the center of Europe. This peace produced a revival of trade and the beginnings of urbanization in the German states, and was accompanied by recurring efforts of the German emperors to break the power of the princes and consolidate their gains. The princes, however, resisted Imperial control, and during the twelfth century many allied themselves with the Pope against the German emperor. By the thirteenth century, the bargains that German emperors were forced to make with the princes for their support against the Papacy had effectively "pulled the rug" from under the feet of the German monarchy; and the fragmentation of German lands into independent units, governed by separate princes who recognized only the vaguest connection with Imperial authority, was complete.

With this fragmentation there was a change in Germany's position in Europe. As a result of the Thirty Years' War, Germany suffered a loss of about 35% of its population, plus terrible destruction of property and deprivation of access to the sea. This turned Germany into an impoverished and handicapped land, the fragmentation of which was legitimized

by the Treaty of Westphalia. Thus German disunity became a part of the "natural order" of things in Europe.

The traumatic effects of the Thirty Years War made a lasting imprint on the German psyche. The survivors were willing to submit unconditionally and uncritically to any authority that seemed strong enough to prevent a recurrence of those horrors. And, with time, this excessive deference to authority also became a part of the "natural order," acquiring the added weight of tradition.

The life of the average German in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was extremely provincial. The characteristics of the small communities (1,000-10,000 in population) in which the majority of the Germans lived were the preeminence of local traditions and customs, close social integrity, and an extreme resistance to change. The great intellectual movement of the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment, had little effect in most average small towns.

The idea of a constitutional government, responsive to an educated and self-reliant citizenry became the program for nineteenth century Liberalism. For the same reasons that many Germans resisted the Enlightenment, they also resisted the onslaught of Liberalism. Instead of these ideas, the inner development of the individual and of the German nation as a unique cultural entity was emphasized. Because their energies were directed inward, this left the decisions for the well being of the ordinary people to the State and its agents. [Ref. 74] (These characteristics were to aid the communists significantly in forcing the people who remained in the Soviet-occupied portions of Germany to accept yet another form of government in which they were to have no say.)

It was not until 1871 when Prince Otto von Bismarck succeeded in actually uniting all thirty-eight German

states. (The Congress of Vienna in 1815 had decided that 38 German states would be more efficient and manageable than the previously existing 300.) At that time, Wilhelm I accepted the crown of the new German empire. That experience did not, however, give the Germans any real experience with democratic rule. It was simply a continuation of rule by a central authority; therefore, the Germans entered the twentieth century without a firm foundation in the liberal, democratic traditions that other major Western European powers had acquired. With a sense that a constitutional government was somehow "un-German." Even the Weimar Republic of 1919 did not represent a true break with the traditional German form of government because most of the crucial positions remained in the hands of those whose primary loyalty was to the institutions of the past. Under these circumstances the Republic had little chance for survival even if it had received the unqualified support of the other Western democracies, which it did not.

The atrocities committed during the Third Reich certainly gave the surviving Germans much to want to forget. They were pariahs in the international system; but with the destruction of the Third Reich, they also had a chance to start over again. How would they do things differently this time--democracy or communism or something uniquely German?

B. THE GOVERNMENT

How has the German tradition affected the people living in the GDR today? What is their relationship with the ruling Communist regime? The East German population continues to hold many of the traditional German values because they still have not been exposed to the experience of democracy, as have their counterparts in the West. The natural inclination of the Germans to respect authority

unquestioningly has no doubt been of benefit to the communist leadership, which in the early 1950s was completely dependent upon the Soviet Union--economically, militarily, politically, and ideologically. Not only was the eastern part of Germany much less industrially developed, but the Soviets had dismantled many industries and factories and moved them physically to Russia in payment for German aggression. The GDR was denied the economic stimulus of the Marshall Plan that the Western sectors received, and the nationalization of the industry was so complete that any incentives to increase efficiency and productivity were also stifled.

In 1952 the SED leadership, headed by Walter Ulbricht, proclaimed that the GDR was launching a program to "build Socialism," which meant first the rapid expansion of heavy industry. However, since the GDR was so poor in hard coal deposits and iron and steel-making capacity, huge investments in massive projects to increase their capabilities inevitably meant that living standards would suffer. By 1953 there were practically no consumer goods and very few food staples available. The second, and equally important, phase of building socialism was an intensification of the class struggle. This meant the middle class, the churches, and what was left of private enterprise would be strictly subjected to the Marxist-Leninist philosophy in every way. In order to force them to follow the approved line, ration cards were withdrawn from offenders, which meant the individuals had to pay greatly inflated prices for food staples, assuming they were available. Children of owners of private businesses or active young Christians could hardly obtain permission to continue their studies, no matter how good their grades. A great program of collectivization of agriculture was initiated, which caused a mass exodus of farmers to the West, which in turn produced great food shortages.

Failure to meet targets (often unreasonable to begin with) in industry and agriculture was considered sabotage and there were many trials for economic crimes.

To make bad matters worse, the SED leadership announced their intentions to raise an army to defend the achievements of the state. Many Germans, young and old, were opposed to this. Only extreme pressure, high pay, and extra privileges could have possibly produced the number of recruits they wanted. And to all these problems was added the heavy strain of reparations to the Soviet Union and Poland. While the grim economic situation was bad enough, the atmosphere of fear, suspicion, and uncertainty was even worse. This period was a copy (although to a lesser degree) of the Great Purges in the Soviet Union. This was aptly illustrated by a comment by Bishop Moritz Mitzenheim:

Late in the evening or during the night a person will be 'taken away' by two persons in civilian clothes, who identify themselves as members of the criminal police. In most cases no reason will be given for the arrest, nor will an arrest warrant be served. [Ref. 75]

It was this situation that caused some 770,000 Germans to seek asylum in the West by 1953. [Ref. 76]

When the government tried to correct the economic situation by raising production norms even further, open revolt occurred. On 9 June 1953, the SED leadership announced the institution of a "New Course," (a reflection of the relaxation of controls in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death). They admitted that the Party and the government had made serious mistakes which the New Program would correct. Discrimination against farmers, craftsmen, the intelligentsia, and their children would cease immediately. Price increases would be withdrawn. Pressure on the teachers to adhere to Marxism-Leninism would be abandoned. Many Party "moderates" hoped that with this the Party would be able to

make a fresh start. But many workers were angry that the higher work norms for the same pay had not been rescinded, and they felt that the time to speak up had come.

On 17 June construction workers in East Berlin went on strike and called for others to do the same. Over 270 localities responded, involving around 372,000 workers--about 5% of the labor force. Even though 5% was a relatively small number, the psychological impact of the workers demonstrating against "their" government was tremendous. The workers were joined by many other sympathizers and the demands spread out to include restoration of the unions and free elections.

It was the latter demand that panicked the SED leadership and caused them to order the young men of the People's Police to stop the riot. When that was not enough force to quell the demonstrations, the SED called on the Soviet armed forces for assistance. The uprising resulted in bloodshed and heavy punishment for hundreds of the participants. Ultimately the economic demands of the strikers were granted, but the political ones were not. [Ref. 77]

What was the position of the members of the SED during this period? There were moderate and hardline factions within the SED, as with the other Communist parties. When Walter Ulbricht very narrowly escaped being overthrown after the June riot, one might have expected him to try to come to some accommodation with the moderate faction, which was closer to the people; but he went on the offensive and began a purge to get rid of them. This accomplished, he still could not produce a party program for the Fourth Party Congress because of the uncertain situation in the Soviet Union, showing just how dependent the GDR party was on the CPSU. Instead he reemphasized the basic aspects of Stalinism, refusing to liberalize anything. At this Congress the SED did claim for the first time to be the guide in all aspects of life in the GDR.

The delegates were disappointed at these pronouncements, having hoped for indications that living standards were going to increase as rapidly as they were in West Germany. Nevertheless, they still gave unanimous support to Ulbricht's proposals, providing the leadership with a veneer of legitimacy. Most of the delegates felt this was part of the transition from a capitalist state to a socialist one, and the best they could do at the moment was to suffer in silence.

As of 1 January 1954 the Soviet Union renounced any claim to further reparations and Poland followed suit. The GDR allies elevated the status of their diplomatic representations in East Berlin from legations to embassies. On 25 March 1954 the Soviets declared that the GDR was free to handle its own internal and foreign policy, including its relations with West Germany, while retaining its rights as specified under the Four Power Agreement. In May of 1955, the Warsaw Treaty Organization was formed and the GDR was invited to become a member; then on 20 September, the Soviet Union and the GDR signed a treaty agreeing to conduct their mutual relations based on "full equality, mutual respect for sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs." [Ref. 78]

Yet in spite of every attempt to confer legitimacy on the regime, an average of 230,000 intellectuals, lawyers, scientists, doctors, technicians, and engineers fled each year to the West. Escape was as simple as going to one of the Western sectors of Berlin and applying for assistance in flying to the West. Gordon Craig graphically describes these years:

The never-ending heresy-hunting and the horrendous penalties meted out for supposed crimes against the State,...the unrelieved thought control, and the tedious nagging by party watchdogs made life in the GDR intolerable for spirited and talented people; and even many who were ideologically committed to the Communist

cause...were moved to leave the country by Ulbricht's periodic striking out at people he considered dangerous opponents, like Wolfgang Harich, professor of Marxist philosophy, who was sentenced to ten years at hard labor in 1957 for demanding intellectual liberty and a more flexible form of Socialism. [Ref. 79]

Seventy-four percent of the almost 2,000,000 refugees were under 45 years of age, and 50 percent under 25, and they included many specialists whose skills were badly needed. One year the entire law faculty of the University of Leipzig defected.

In August 1961, the number of refugees reached 2,000 aday. Walter Ulbricht's solution to this problem was a permanent blockade of Berlin--no one would fly in or out of the city without his permission! This solution was apparently too drastic for the Soviets, however, and he was instructed to only block the traffic between the Eastern and Western sectors of the city. And so, on 13 August 1961, the East German police strung barbed wire and put up roadblocks along the inner boundary of the eight districts in the Soviet sector of Berlin, followed by the construction of a cement wall (when the West mounted no effective opposition) guarded from watchtowers by armed sentries who had orders to shoot anyone attempting to go over it.

In the months after the closing of the primary escape hatch to the West, the East Germans seemed to come to terms with the realities of their new existence and were ready to begin making the most of their lives. The government responded to this mood by instituting the "New Economic System" which established more reasonable production goals and put a greater emphasis upon achievement, managerial skills, and lessening excessive bureaucratic interference. There was to be some decentralization of economic decision-making, the reintroduction of profit, better trained

management personnel, the use of cybernetics, and a greater effort to make GDR products internationally competitive. By 1965, industrial production was reportedly 43% above the level of 1958 and part of that growth was being passed on to the consumer. Ownership of televisions went from 5.1% in 1958 to 48% in 1965 to 74.5% in 1967; refrigerators went from 2.1% to 26% to 43.7%; and washing machines from 1.6% to 28% to 44.3% [Ref. 80]. An important psychological improvement occurred over the Christmas holiday of 1963-64--the Berlin Wall was opened to let West Berliners visit their relatives. Over 1.2 million visits were made in the few days it was open.

The fall of Khrushchev on 15 October 1964 was a complete surprise to the GDR (as elsewhere), and the more conservative mood in Moscow was soon mirrored in the SED. A turning point was reached in December 1965 when Erich Honecker, heir apparent to Ulbricht, indicated a return to the old orthodoxy. Honecker's ascension to power in 1971 signaled the end of the New Economic System and Ulbricht's reinterpretation of socialism, and the return to strict adherence to the Soviet interpretations and models.

The New Economic System had not produced the effect that Ulbricht had hoped for--a quick, qualitative leap into a higher standard of living by taking advantage of the scientific-technological revolution--but it did produce a management strata that was beginning to think independently outside of Party control. It also encouraged favoritism of some branches of the economy over others which jeopardized the overall economic interrelations. The economic situation was deteriorating in 1969 and 1970. In December 1970, no doubt significantly influenced by the strikes in Poland which toppled the Gomulka government, the Central Committee of the SED terminated the economic reform effort and reinstated centralized planning. However, they were quite aware

of the necessity for a balance between investment and consumer goods, not wanting a repeat of Polish unrest to occur in the GDR. [Ref. 82]

The FRG's Ostpolitik posed a broad challenge to the leadership of the GDR, which met it with the idea of Abgrenzung (imposing internal policies on its citizens that would limit, to the maximum extent possible, contact with the West). From September 1970 on, the SED tried to dampen the enthusiasm of their people for contact with the West by emphasizing the difference between the East and the West. There was now no such thing as a German nation and culture. Since the FRG had chosen the path of decadent capitalism, the citizens of the two states had grown apart, with different experiences and different consciousnesses. The Party attempted to force the pace of the development of a separate GDR consciousness and loyalty using various measures: replacing, wherever possible the word "German" with "GDR," and placing more emphasis on the Soviet model in the media and the schools, for example. [Ref. 83]

At the beginning of 1978, the West German magazine Der Spiegel published paper called "Manifesto of the First Organized Opposition in the GDR," showing that resistance to "Sovietization" of German society did exist in spite of all the Party's efforts. The first part is distinctly anti-Soviet in attitude and calls for the restoration of a unified German state. The individuals responsible for this paper still have not been clearly identified, but the SED at that time reacted swiftly both domestically and against the FRG, considerably complicating intra-German relations for a while [Ref. 84].

The 1980s saw the beginning of a "peace movement" in the GDR. On 9 May 1981 a small group of Christians in Dresden presented a proposal to the East German parliament to enact a "social peace service" as an alternative to mandatory

military service. They expressed their concern over the continuing arms race and the increasing militarism in the East German society, calling for a two year peace service involving work in hospitals, old age homes, kindergartens, etc., as opposed to eighteen months of military service. It was not until mid-September that the official Party reply to this proposal was given by the State Secretary for Church Affairs:

Peace marches (for example, between Brussels and Paris) have an alluring effect on young people, and the ideas expressed over there also affect us. Such is the case of the "social peace service" proposal which, in part, has also come from the outside. It is normal...that such proposals should also appear among us. Only it isn't possible. For an entire array of reasons....Whoever is not in agreement with the clear position of the state on this issue demonstrates that, for him, it is a question of confrontation. The demand for a "social peace service" cannot be justified either theologically or religiously....Moreover, it is not the task of the church to change laws and the Constitution. In addition, there are people in the West who desire to see a confrontation among us. The current regulation with the construction soldier option is one of the most progressive in the world. There is no reason to deviate from it. We need everyone and cannot afford to abolish mandatory conscription. [Ref. 85]

The issue did not simply go away, as the Party may have hoped, with that strong warning; and in October 1981, Robert Havemann, while still under de facto house arrest, sent an open letter to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev before his visit to the FRG in 1981. He stated:

Originally, it seemed that through the partition (of Germany) a dangerous aggressor had been deprived of power for good and that peace in Europe was insured. The result, however, has been the opposite....What Germany's partition created was not security but the precondition for the deadliest of threats that has ever existed in Europe....What matters above all is to extricate both partners of Germany from the bloc confrontation. In this connection, it is opportune to recall that up until the 1960s the Soviet Union called for the demilitarization and neutralization of all of Germany. Now, 36 years after the end of the war, it has become an urgent necessity to conclude the peace treaties and to withdraw all occupation troops from both parts of Germany. (It goes without saying that the position of West Berlin must remain secure.) After this, it should

be left up to the Germans to determine how we will solve our national problem--and nobody should fear more than they do the possibility of nuclear war. [Ref. 86]

And then in December 1981, Pastor Rainer Eppelmann issued his so-called Berlin Appeal, listing the peace movement's demands. [Ref. 87]

1. Free all Germany from the East-West conflict.
2. Create a nuclear free zone in Europe.
3. Demilitarize Germany.
4. Sign a peace treaty with both German states
5. Withdraw the "troops of occupation" from both sides.
6. Establish superpower guarantees of non-intervention.
7. Create an alternative to military service.
8. Ban military education in the schools.
9. Ban military parades.
10. Ban war toys from the schools.
11. End civil defense exercises.

By 1982, the unofficial peace movement involved from 2,000 to 5,000 individuals in East Germany [Ref. 88]. Their main concerns were the positions mentioned above plus police harassment of people engaged in peace initiatives, and the contrast between official praise for the Western peace movement and the government's discouragement of the organization of a similar movement in the GDR.

On the 37th anniversary of the Anglo-U.S. bombing of Dresden, the first unofficial peace demonstration in the history of the GDR occurred. After the official ceremonies, some 5,000 people, mostly young, gathered in the Church of the Cross to attend a "Peace Forum" sponsored by the East German Evangelical Lutheran Church of Saxony (and approved by the government). After the program there, however, some 3,000 of those attending marched across town, without the approval of the Church or the regime, and held a candle light vigil in a burned out church which was a war memorial.

That incident set a precedent for future peace activities in the GDR. Other forums were scheduled, and in June, a Peace Workshop was conducted on the ground of the Church of the Redeemer outside of East Berlin, attracting over 3,000 people. [Ref. 89]

The Evangelical Church has a history of playing a prominent role in issues relating to European security. It was involved in the 1950s debates over rearmament and integration of the FRG into NATO and the controversy in the GDR after the introduction of conscription in 1962. One of the major differences in the present and past situations is that the current debate is taking place under the aegis of the partial church-state rapprochement worked out between the church and the Honecker regime in 1971. The church has consistently avoided putting itself in a position of direct confrontation with the SED, however, it has played a critical role in the development of the peace movement. First, in addition to being a source of moral encouragement and a rallying point, it has provided a protective umbrella for independent debate by setting up various "think tanks" to study the issues. These groups have produced a variety of position papers on various subjects such as the morality of nuclear weapons, "Eurostrategic" weapons, and most recently on balanced troop reductions in the FRG and the GDR. Church authorities have also been known to intervene to protect individuals who come into conflict with the state as a result of their peace activities. [Ref. 90]

What has been the government's response to the peace movement? First, there was an intensive campaign by the FDJ, the official East German youth organization, using the slogan "Peace Must Be Defended--Peace Must Be Armed," designed to combat any pacifist or anti-militarist tendencies in the young people. Second, it has adjusted its propaganda to counter the attractiveness of certain neutralist

positions by reminding the people that the Western peace movement does not mean that the Western governments have any intention of being peaceful. The people are urged to make their personal contribution to the preservation of peace by meeting higher production quotas and overfulfilling the plan. The rationale for this is the slogan, "The stronger socialism is, the more secure is peace." Third, they have strengthened para-military training in schools and have used the time-tested method of deportation to deal with the more visible peace activists. If they refused to emigrate, they would be called up for reservist military duty, refusal of which can be a prison term of up to eighteen months.

The real question is why hasn't the regime absolutely cracked down on the movement as it has on so many dissident movements in the past? One reason was certainly its international image. 1983 was the 500th Anniversary of the birth of Martin Luther and several programs were scheduled in the GDR involving international participation. The SED obviously wanted to put its best face forward. It is also likely that they realize that harsh repression would result in a further deterioration of the already-troubled church-state relations, and further alienate the young people, which could prove to be counterproductive to long term stability. Apparently they have decided that the most prudent course to follow (for the moment anyway) is to isolate the most radical members of the movement and to try to coopt as many of the concerns, slogans, and members of the movement as possible into the officially approved peace movement. [Ref. 91]

Despite the frequent turbulence on the cultural scene, the SED has not faced a serious revolt since 1953. What does this say about the depth of support for the regime? To a great extent the people of the GDR have been coopted, as in Czechoslovakia. The reach of the Party is pervasive in

the society, and it has shown itself quite capable of brutal repression when necessary. The living conditions have improved, although they have never matched those in the West. The people have acquired a higher level of material possessions and economic security that they are generally not willing to risk by open confrontations with the regime. Many have grown up under communism. They know no other life, and as the following examination of Party members will show, they recognize the shortcomings of their system, but would respond favorably to reforms of the system and not its abandonment.

There appears to be a growing sense of national identity and pride in their accomplishments which gives a certain amount of surface legitimacy to the regime. Whether the regime can capitalize on these feelings is another matter. In creating a society that is capable of producing high quality scientific and technological products, the amount of education necessary to accomplish this has created a society capable of thinking and questioning. That quality coupled with increasing alienation among the young people both from the crass materialism in the West and from the hypocrisy of their own regime could make them decide in the future that material possessions are not enough; that they want intellectual freedom also.

Before examining the important points of GDR/Soviet relations, a brief look at the composition and attitudes of the more than two million members of the SED might be useful. Why did they join? As mentioned above, most have not known any other political system. It seems that the majority, especially the intelligentsia, have joined for a combination of self-interest and the hope that through the Party they can do something to improve life in the GDR. Few have any real knowledge of Marx, Engels, or Lenin. Older members tend to be disillusioned--having witnessed events

like the June Rising (1953), the denunciation of Stalin (1956), the fall of Khrushchev (1964), the invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968), and the treatment of Ulbricht (1971)--and have concentrated on their personal and professional lives. Most members, young and old, are somewhat embarrassed by the system's shortcomings and yet they continue to reject the poverty, crime, and violence of Western life. They are uneasy about the pervasive militarism in their society, but they continue to play their part. They are distinctly Western in their tastes--looking to the West for fashion, films, music, and television. As stated before, these people would in all likelihood respond to reforms to the system rather than agitate for its overthrow. [Ref. 92]

In examining Soviet-GDR relations, it would be helpful to recap the crisis periods of Ulbricht's rule because these were also the primary times of tension between the SED and the CPSU. The first challenge came with the workers' uprising in 1953. The relative ease of being able to go to the Western sectors and the poor living conditions in the Eastern sector of Germany were largely responsible for the uprising, but the fact that the Soviets had to step in to control the situation considerably lessened their confidence in Ulbricht in spite of his long history as a Moscow man. His job was on shaky ground for a while, but Stalin's death caused upheaval in the CPSU as well, and while the new leadership was trying to consolidate its power, they were content to let Ulbricht continue in his position.

After the uprisings in Hungary and Poland in 1956, Ulbricht's credibility went up again in the eyes of the Soviet leaders because he had resisted the liberalization trend and kept firm control in the GDR. By 1963, Ulbricht had come to feel that he had a special "in" with the CPSU and could influence Soviet decisions, at least in regard to

things that affected the GDR. This confidence led him, in 1967, to "redefine" socialism, which did not please the Soviets much, but they were too preoccupied with Czechoslovakia to do much about it at the moment. Ulbricht again stood firm against the Soviets permitting the liberalization in Czechoslovakia to continue. He pressed hard for Soviet intervention, and his opinion of the amount of influence he wielded was no doubt reconfirmed when they did decide to invade. Ironically, however, the invasion was the end of his special influence because the Soviet leadership was no longer weak or undecided.

From that point on, significant differences in the Soviet and GDR interests began to emerge over the issue of rapprochement with West Germany. Ulbricht became painfully aware of his subordinate position when contrary to all his arguing, he was forced into some meetings with West German officials. After Erich Honecker replaced him as First Secretary, the slightly deviant policies of the GDR fell absolutely back in line with Soviet wishes. Article 6 of the 1974 Constitution states that the GDR "is for ever and irrevocably allied with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and is "an inseparable part of the community of socialist states. Faithful to the principles of socialist internationalism, it contributes to its strengthening, cultivates and develops friendship, universal co-operation and mutual assistance with all states of the socialist community." [Ref. 93]

In spite of these differences, Soviet-GDR relations have remained basically harmonious because of a shared fundamental objective: the continued commitment to the division of the German nation [Ref. 94]. The GDR knows that its very existence is the most valuable single gain in Europe the Soviet Union has made since World War II and seeks to use both its strengths and weaknesses to ensure continued Soviet

commitment. Its strengths are a relatively well developed economy which supplies the Soviets with more sophisticated machinery (although this aspect could be of lesser importance in recent years as the Soviets have gained access to advanced Western technology), and its key strategic position in Europe--facing West Germany and constituting a barrier to the westward leanings of Polish society. Its primary weakness, of course, is the continuing uncertainty about the loyalty of the GDR public. [Ref. 95]

To help make sure of continued Soviet interest in its welfare, the GDR has practically become another Soviet Republic. It is aware that the Soviet Union could survive without the GDR, but it is not so sure that it could survive without the Soviets. Therefore, Honecker has taken great care to increase and institutionalize Soviet-GDR bilateral ties. He has faithfully championed all Soviet positions, sometimes to greater extremes than the Soviets themselves. There have been "exchanges of experience" at all levels of party organization, from the very top, through the Central Committee and Secretariat, to regional, district, and sometimes even individual enterprise organizations. It seems that these exchanges are well on their way to becoming formalized. [Ref. 96]

What this amounts to is almost complete Soviet control in significant areas of the GDR government, which allows considerable influence in the GDR society. This is one of the reasons the GDR is considered a reliable Soviet ally.

C. THE MILITARY

From a time in the early fifties when the National People's Army (NVA), just recently upgraded from the designation as the Garrisoned People's Police, was gratified to even be saluted by members of the other WTO armies to 1984

when the NVA soldier takes an oath "to be always ready, side by side with the Soviet Army and the armies of our socialist allies, to protect socialism against all enemies and to risk my life for the achievement of victory" [Ref. 97], a lot has happened. It is now recognized as the number two army in the WTO. In 1972, Thomas Forster, a German expert on the NVA, characterized the GDR armed forces in three ways:

1. It had very close ties with the Soviet Army.
2. It had no military doctrine of its own, relying exclusively on that of the Soviet Union.
3. It had extensive influence throughout East German society and government.

Today those characteristics remain the same and have been amplified. As mentioned earlier, the 1974 Constitution states that the GDR is "permanently and irrevocably allied to the U.S.S.R." It has not just adopted Soviet military doctrine, but is trying to promote complete adoption of Soviet behavior and ways of thought. And the enhanced influence of the NVA in the government and society can be seen in the transfer of control over the entire civil defense system in 1978 from the Ministry of the Interior to the Defense Ministry. In civilian life, "defense instruction" was introduced in 1978 as a compulsory subject in the 9th and 10th grades of the polytechnic schools in spite of the earlier mentioned opposition by the churches and many citizens. [Ref. 98]

It is impossible to understand the East German military or to evaluate its current reliability without understanding the unique historical conditions that resulted in its creation. The fact that the GDR is an artificial Soviet creation made its military originally an army without a nation, and thus traditional feelings of patriotism and loyalty to the nation were absent. This lack of legitimacy

has resulted in ideology becoming the source of cohesion, discipline, and morale in the military, which explains the singleminded obsession with indoctrination in the NVA. RAND scholar Robert Dean describes the situation as follows:

Because national loyalties that conflict with Party loyalties are improbable, and because the army has no separate source of national cohesion and no separate sense of purpose beyond its defense of the state interests as defined by the Party, peacetime Party control may be facilitated. In other words, the uncertain political legitimacy in the GDR tends to reinforce military loyalty to the Party. This strong identity of interests would logically tend to generate an urge toward subordination in the officer corps. Because national stewardship cannot serve as a convincing justification or platform for political intervention, there is less potential for the officer corps and its leadership to develop into a potential counter-elite (a judgment one could make with less certainty about other Warsaw Pact states where the military may see itself as the repository of national values). [Ref. 99]

The Yalta and Potsdam agreements forbade a German military force, but the Soviet Military Administration began building one almost immediately after the war in their sector of Germany in the form of a paramilitary people's police. By December 1946, the People's Police force already numbered some 45,000. By September 1947, 4,000 men had been trained as the German Frontier Police and armed with pistols and the 98 k carbine of the old Wehrmacht, totally disregarding the Allied Control Council's directive giving the control of frontiers and demarcation lines exclusively to Allied soldiers until the conclusion of a German peace treaty. During 1948, some 1,000 former Wehrmacht officers in Soviet POW camps were persuaded to serve in the new Soviet Zone units, and by summer three types of forces existed: the regular People's Police (DVP), the German Frontier Police (DGP), and the Garrisoned Alert Squads. The latter were renamed the Garrisoned People's Police (KVP) and became the nucleus for the GDR land, air, and naval forces [Ref. 100]. When the Soviets created the German Democratic

Republic in October 1949, they turned the administration of these forces over to the new government, and by 1950 the KVP had 70,000 members, the DGP 18,000, and the DVP 80,000 non-military (mainly administrative) members.

The June 1953 uprising provided the first opportunity for use of the KVP, and it proved less than satisfactory. This group was made up primarily of young men who had grown up idolizing first Hitler, then Stalin. Their lives had been turned upside down by the defeat of Hitler and the death of Stalin. The final stroke was the incomprehensible order from the government to take up arms against the German workers who were revolting against "their" government. These forces were not able (probably in good part because of a lack of will) to contain the uprising and Soviet troops and tanks had to be used. That resulted in the purging of some 12,000 members of all ranks as "unreliable elements." On January 18, 1956, the East German parliament passed a bill for the creation of a National People's Army and a Ministry for National Defense, the final step in the creation of the GDR military.

As early as January 1956 the Political Consultative Committee of the WTO decided that all elements of the NVA should be included in the WTO Joint Armed Forces, but the transfer was not completed until the mid sixties for political reasons (that is, when the West German Bundeswehr was assigned to NATO). What that transfer in effect meant was total strategic control (and significant control or influence in the lower echelons) by the Soviet Union over the GDR forces.

There is no doubt that this posture has been encouraged by GDR leadership. One of their fundamental objectives in case of a war with NATO is to eliminate any chance for a separate agreement between the Soviet Union and Western powers at the expense of the GDR. Their military doctrine

anticipates that one of NATO's strategic objectives would be to overrun and occupy the GDR as quickly as possible, isolating it from its allies and making the cost of retaking that territory unacceptably high. In view of the political insecurities of the regime, it is likely that they see integration with the Soviets as the means for ensuring that a war with the GDR will escalate immediately into a conflict with the Soviet Union. [Ref. 101]

Evidence of Soviet control of the NVA began from the very outset of its creation with Soviet-designed officer training. According to Forster,

As early as 1950 5,000 junior Garrisoned Police officers went for training to the Soviet Union in that year alone...By 1975 1,000 NVA officers had graduated from Soviet military academies. In addition to weaponry and other specialist courses, land and air force officers of the NVA destined for general rank are given two or three years training at the Frunze Academy in Moscow, usually combined with attendance at the Soviet General Staff Academy. By November 1969 more than a hundred NVA cadres had attended the General Staff Academy and another twenty generals and admirals been through the Senior Academic Course. For future People's Navy admirals, the services of the 1st Baltic Marine College in Leningrad and the 2nd Baltic Marine College in Kaliningrad are available. [Ref. 102]

In the beginning less than half of the officers had attended an Officers' College, but since 1979 almost all have. Also one of every four instructors at the Academy now has earned a degree at a Soviet academy.

The 1957 Status of Forces Agreement between the GDR and the Soviet Union regulates the twenty divisions of the Soviet Group of Forces (SGFG) stationed in East Germany. Article 18 of this agreement illustrates the difference in the Soviet treatment of the forces of the GDR and other WTO countries. It states

in case of any threat to the security of Soviet troops stationed on GDR territory, the Supreme Command of Soviet Forces in the GDR may take measures to eliminate it in consultation with the GDR government and with due

regard to the situation arising and to measures taken by the state authorities of the GDR. [Ref. 103]

What this means is that the Commander-in-Chief of the SGFG can declare a state of emergency throughout the country whenever he likes. East German writers dispute the conclusion that this article abrogates the sovereignty of the GDR by making it completely dependent on the Soviet Union. They say the "independence and sovereignty for a socialist state mean above all independence of (from) capitalism, and the people's right to establish socialism and communism." [Ref. 104]

The actual presence of Soviet representatives in military organizations of the GDR is most pervasive. The representative of the WTO Supreme Command in the GDR has his office in the GDR Ministry for National Defense. Through him the authority of the WTO is exercised in matters of planning, logistics, standardization, and exercises. From the regimental level upwards, Soviet and NVA commanders regularly work together to prepare exercises and maneuvers, which have increased significantly since 1969. Additionally, there are some 80 Soviet staff officers also present in the GDR Defense Ministry, and a Soviet general is usually present at high-level NVA meetings, and copies of the plans and proposals developed in these and other meetings routinely go to the Soviet military mission in the GDR. [Ref. 105]

While some of the GDR politicians might have liked to see complete integration of the GDR military with the Soviets, (at one time Gen. Hoffman supported a Soviet military presence down to the battalion level) practical experience suggests that it is not possible. After 1969 there was apparently a campaign started to increase contact and comradeship between the GDR soldiers and the Soviet

"regiment next door," with the ultimate objective being to increase the loyalty of the NVA to the USSR and to create conditions for more effective integration in wartime. However, a statement by GDR Defense Minister Hoffman in a April 1974 editorial in Militaerwesen indicated that "cooperation with the Soviet comrades in daily military life does not lead spontaneously to a new stage of internationalist thought and action." [Ref. 106] In interviews with former East German officers the following observation were made:

We trained together with the Russians at the regiment level. We have already said that the training was very hard in the NVA. However, when we trained together with the Russians, we saw how hard the Russians trained (and that) we still had it much better.... For example, we saw in the Schwarzwald how 127 Soviet soldiers slept in one room--127 who had no individual lockers but just a tiny night drawer where they kept their uniforms. One could say that what was valid for the Prussians earlier is also certainly valid for the Soviets, that he who has sworn allegiance to the Soviet flag once cannot hope to preserve his individuality. This is a problem of which (the authorities) should be careful because in the final analysis it has led to a certain distance between the NVA and the Soviet army which was not there ten years before. This is for the simple reason that in the Soviet soldier's consciousness certain doubts and conflicts have developed after he has seen how the NVA soldier lives within his barracks, what rights he has as a person in the army, etc. As political deputies we were especially confronted with this problem. One aspect of the (German-Russian) military competition dealt with joint work and cooperation with the Soviet unit, and yet the political deputies of the Soviet army very often were reluctant to participate and not interested in meetings between Soviet soldiers and soldiers of the NVA simply because the differences and contradictions would then come out in the open and that had negative consequences within the Soviet army. [Ref. 107]

Another commented that such contacts "naturally led to envy, especially when the simple Soviet soldier who sees that the German who was defeated (in the war) lives much better than he does (and finds it hard) to regard the Germans as brother-in-arms." And still another observed:

We had a group of Soviet soldiers on one occasion invited to our barracks and one could see in the faces of the soldiers how surprised they were when they saw our lockers and equipment, everything that we had. They simply could not understand that. Then we sat down to eat at tables that were covered with white tablecloths; everybody had a complete dinner set with the respective parts, plates, a cake plate, a salad bowl, etc. The Russians just sat at the table and didn't dare to touch anything, let alone eat, until the political deputy ordered them in a loud voice to start eating.
[Ref. 108]

In addition to these reasons, the problem with language skills also discouraged integration below the divisional level. While NVA officers are sometimes able to use Russian effectively, the majority of their troops cannot.

Another factor to consider in the integration problem is the fact that while the SED is not completely viewed as having a legitimate right to rule by many Germans, at least they are Germans. Opposition to the extensive militarism of the German society is widespread enough without making it appear that the German military is in fact controlled by foreigners. In this regard, the SED has begun to stress the GDR's "progressive" military tradition. But this is not enough; there needs to be a link with actual German traditions. It is difficult for the SED to produce a consistent historical picture of the German past since it claims to have broken with it, and since it espouses the view that only popular masses are capable of achieving historical progress. Obviously a military tradition cannot be linked to an anonymous mass, so the NVA has devised several headings under which traditional German accomplishments can be grouped:

1. Glorious feats of arms in the service of progress
2. Great soldiers and military politicians
3. Exemplary socialist fighting groups
4. Exemplary NVA units
5. German-Russian brotherhood-in-arms
6. Socialist brotherhood-in-arms. [Ref. 109]

Having discussed the NVA in general terms, it will now be useful to look in detail at the structure and equipment of the 1984 NVA, as well as discussing its mission and training. Table III shows the composition of the NVA. While it is not the smallest of the WTO armies, it is the smallest of the crucial Northern Tier armies with 167,000 total troops, of which over half (92,000) are conscripts who serve 18 months in the Army and Air Force and 36 months in the Navy. And while it does not have the most modern of the Soviet equipment, it is as well equipped as the other Northern Tier states, having such items as the T-72 medium tank, the BMP-1 armored personnel carrier, (See Military section of the previous chapter.) and the SAU-122. As in Czechoslovakia and Poland, it also has an airborne battalion.

What is the mission of the forces of the NVA in case of a war with NATO? Since 1967 the NVA has been incorporated into the first strategic echelon of the WTO. This means its forces would be immediately involved in combat operations. The army will either fight separately as a national army group or be assigned to higher Soviet formations which will march on to West German territory. The navy, together with the Soviet Baltic Fleet and the Polish Navy, will have the task of securing the coastal flank of the invading communist armies and provide support from the sea, including amphibious operations and logistic aid. The air force, which is totally integrated into the WTO air defense network, would be used almost exclusively in that capacity. Under some circumstances, it could also give limited support to the land offensive. [Ref. 110]

Combat training for the NVA corresponds closely to that provided to the Soviet army. Procedures and equipment are standardized. At the divisional level and below, the logistics system is the responsibility of the NVA [Ref. 111].

TABLE III
German Democratic Republic, 1984

Population: 16,760,000

Military Service: Army, Air Force--18 months
Navy (sea-going)--36 months

Total regular forces: 167,000 (92,000 conscript)

ARMY: 116,000 (69,000 conscr.)

2 Military Dists., 2 Army
Headquarters
2 tank div. (Cat. I)
4 mot. rifle div. (Cat. I)
2 SSM brgd. with Scud
2 artillery rgmts.
2 antiartillery rgmts.
2 air defense rgmts. w/SA-4s
3 signals regiments
3 engineering regiments
1 railway construction rgmt.
2 attack battalions
1 airborne battalion

Equipment:

1,500 T-54/55/72 tanks
1,000 BMP (MICV)
1,000 BDRM-1/2 scout cars
1,500 armored pers. carriers
24 Frog-7, 18 Scud-B SSMS
AT-3 Sagger, AT-4 Spigot
ATGW, SA-4/6/7/9 SAMs

AIR FORCE: 37,000 (15,000 con.)
359 combat acft, 30 armed helos.
2 air divisions:
6 air defense rgmts.--300 MiG-21F/23s

4 fighter squads w/MiG-17/23s
1 reccon. squads. w/MiG-21s
7 SAM regiments w/SA-2/3s
2 radar regiments
1 transport regiment
2 helo. rgmts w/Mi-2/3/8/24s
AAMs: AA-2 Atoll
ASMs: AT-3 Sagger ATGW

NAVY: 14,000 (8,000 conscr.)

5 combat helicopters
2 Rostock frigates w/SA-N-4 SAMs
9 Parchim corvettes w/SA-N-5 SAMs
15 Osa-1 FAC(M) w/Styx
48 FAC(T): 18 Shershen, 30 Libelle
6 Hai large patrol craft
45 coastal minesweepers
12 Frosch LST
2 Kondor-1 intelligence collection vessels
4 supply ships, 5 tankers
2 light transports
1 helicopter Squad. w/13

RESERVES: 25,000

PARAMILITARY FORCES: 74,000

Ministry of Defense:
Frontier Troops (48,000)

Ministry for State Security:

1 Guard regiment (Berlin) (7,000)--6 motorized rifle & one artillery btn. w/APC antiaircraft guns, helicopters

Ministry of Interior:

People's Police Alert Units (10,500)--w/APCs and 82mm mortar
Transpt. Police (8,500)
Workers Militia: (15,000 combat groups)

Source: Military Balance 1983/84, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London; reprinted in Air Force Magazine, December, 1983, p. 80.

The core of the training program is the simulation of fighting under war conditions, with all the exertion and privations involved. On longer exercises the units take all their military equipment with them as a test of mobility and combat-readiness. Prime importance is placed on maneuverability. Long marches, motorized or on foot, day and night, in fair weather or foul, are characteristic of these exercises, practicing the following basic scenarios:

1. Stopping an attack launched across the state frontier
2. Counterattacking into "Aggressor-land"
3. Destroying "diversionary" troops and parachutists."

The previously mentioned missions of the navy and the air force condition the type of training each receives. They are both trained on a much smaller scale than the army.
[Ref. 112]

Before one can make a final evaluation of the reliability of the GDR armed forces, it is necessary to examine two other aspects: political control and professionalization (i.e. technical qualification). From the very outset of the establishment of the NVA, GDR (and Soviet) politicians decided that they were prepared to take whatever steps were necessary to make sure that the East German military remained firmly under Party control. During the mid-sixties, with the introduction of the New Economic System, it was decided that the ideal NVA officer was one who was both technically and politically qualified, as well as actively engaged in party as well as technical activities [Ref. 113]. In order to preclude the "strong feelings of institutional identity, common interests, and exclusivist professional attitudes" from combining with the "monopoly of the means of violence" to breed "autonomy or political assertiveness," the Party's system of political control in the military had to be effective [Ref. 114]. This fact was

in conflict with the need for the development of specific military concerns. Nevertheless, the SED set out to achieve such contradictory goals.

The first way to do this was to ensure that the political officer was a qualified military man in his own right. In theory, command authority in the NVA rests solely with the military commander. In practice, however, his authority is nominal because his second in command, the political officer, is the head of a separate chain of command which monitors the commander's decisions and has the power to circumvent them in case of a disagreement between the two. However, since the career of the political deputy depends as much, and maybe even more, on the unit's performance in military competition and achievement of standards as that of the military commander, there is a powerful impetus for cooperation and compromise. This tends to dilute party control. Usually the political officers are drawn from the ranks of the troops, NCOs, or officers and do not follow a specifically political career track. One former officer, who described his situation as typical, was first trained as a technical officer in the air force, and, after having served in that capacity for some years, was appointed as a political officer [Ref. 115]. Former NVA officers interviewed by Robert Dean indicated that at least through the rank of captain interchanging officers between military and political functions was commonplace. [Ref. 116]

As far as professionalization goes, the original officer corps of the NVA was inadequately prepared in a general educational sense and severely deficient in technical military training. Between 1962 and 1964, many officers were forced to leave the service because they could not qualify in technical, administrative, and teaching skills [Ref. 117]. By 1969 all officers were required to pass standardized examinations in three separate areas: a

military-technical specialty, administration and political education (sufficient to qualify as a county party secretary), and an equivalent civilian profession, usually a teacher or an engineer [Ref. 118].

One of the most attractive aspects of a military career is the access it provides to the middle and higher echelons of the state and party apparatus. While there are no figures to indicate the percentage of officers who make this move, former NVA officers describe such a career pattern as typical. Since promotion within the armed forces depends upon the party, the officer's political reliability has been carefully scrutinized during his entire career. Another inducement to a military career is the fact that there is considerable prestige attached to the profession of military officers in the GDR (at least from the official organizations). Therefore the pay and benefits that go along with a military career are substantial, tending to minimize and conflict with civilian authorities over these matters. [Ref. 119]

Theoretically, the more professional, i.e. technically oriented, the military is the less likely they will be interested in political questions, other than those that concern their specific needs (salaries, weapons systems, etc.). However, it also appears that the more technically oriented the military is, the less it wants to waste time with political indoctrination. And in the final evaluation, would the Soviet Union trust an army that was technically superior, but politically ignorant or indifferent? Not likely! The question is how successful has the SED been in combining these two aspects. The results of Dale Herspring's study through 1972 show that they had considerable success up to that time [Ref. 120]. Robert Dean's research (finalized in 1980) indicated, however that the more specialization occurred, the less politically inclined the

NVA soldiers have become, especially in the face of detente. As the head of the Party Central Committee Security Department observed:

In the implementation of our policy of peaceful coexistence, the class fronts and the class enemy are not always immediately recognizable for young Party members and especially for young army members. It is sometimes difficult for these young people to recognize the connections between the struggle for peaceful coexistence, strengthening of the military power of socialism and the struggle against the imperialist system and to draw conclusions from this for their work. [Ref. 121]

These factors notwithstanding, it seems that the GDR has succeeded in creating an officer corps that has a substantial degree of commitment to its policies (and thus, by implication to the Soviet Union.).

D. THE GDR IN THE WTO

The integration of the GDR into the WTO has already been mentioned in several places. From the very beginning of their participation in the WTO, the GDR has used joint maneuvers to display German-Soviet "brotherhood-in-arms" in practice. The GDR participated in at least 27 ground forces/combined arms exercises in this period. Of these, 7 were held exclusively on German territory, 9 completely outside of their territory, and 11 jointly on GDR and Polish or Czechoslovak territory.

That this has been successful and has inspired Soviet confidence in the GDR is evidenced by the fact that GDR Defense Minister and NVA Commander, Gen. Heinz Hoffman, has been given the opportunity of commanding no less than three of the major joint WTO exercises--"Quartet" in 1963, "Brotherhood of Arms" in 1970, and "Autumn Storm" in 1971--a distinction not given to other non-Soviet WTO commanders

[Ref. 122]. In addition, they always try to establish a direct link between these exercises and the elimination of international crises. Thus, the land exercises being conducted at the time of the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 were characterized as "mounting a reliable guard and effective control over the GDR's frontiers with West Berlin and the Federal Republic," which "frustrated an act of aggression against the GDR planned by the West German imperialists," smashing "an attempt by revanchiste adventurers to incorporate our socialist state in the NATO power-bloc and resolutely prevented what might have been a worldwide conflagration." [Ref. 123] And in 1965 anti-Western propaganda was increased before the announcement of the large "Oktobersturm" exercise naming Bonn as "the main enemy, an aggressive power only waiting to cross the border by force of arms." [Ref. 124]

GDR participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia was also explained in terms of a crisis--"counter-revolution" to whose "deadly threat" socialism in Czechoslovakia would have succumbed if it were it not for the fraternal assistance of the five WTO countries. However, German occupation troops were removed shortly after the invasion because the troops, at the admission of the commanders could no longer be relied upon to suppress the population. GDR troops were soon only allowed to move around at night because Czechoslovak public opinion saw their presence as a repeat of Hitler's occupation in 1938/39. Another, and probably more important, reason for their removal, in the minds of the Soviets anyway, was the fact that many Czechs were familiar with the situation in Germany and spoke German. Too many German-Czech discussions would damage the Soviet's cause. [Ref. 125]

Another aspect indicating the degree of reliability with which the Soviets view the GDR is its increasing military

cooperation with the Third World. Since 1972, the GDR has taken over much of the "proxy" assistance that had previously been provided by Czechoslovakia, including the presence of technicians and military advisors as well as providing arms. Indeed, in this area the GDR in recent years has played a more active role than any of its WTO counterparts [Ref. 126]. By 1977, 22 African and Middle East states had received aid from the GDR either in the form of arms (Morocco, Mali, Ghana, Libya, Lebanon, North Yemen, Behrein), arms and training (Algeria, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Somalia, South Yemen, Syria, Iraq), or technical assistance (Tanzania, India, Laos, Angola). And East German representatives were present on Grenada prior to the American intervention. Current figures from the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London indicate the strength of GDR forces stationed abroad as follows: [Ref. 127]

Algeria - 250	Libya - 400
Angola - 450	Mozambique- 100
Ethiopia - 550	South Yemen - 75
Guinea - 125	Syria - 210
Iraq - 160	

Thus, it appears that in spite of retention of Soviet control in the WTO,⁶ indicating lack of trust in its "allies," the traditional GDR slavish adoption of Soviet

⁶The reforms of 1969 appear to have been more show than substance. The non-Soviet members have been consulted more, but have hardly been given more decisionmaking authority. In the military-operational aspects of the alliance, the Soviets still dominate the command structure, control the alliance's nuclear warheads, and solely provide logistic support in key areas such as communications, transport, and supplies (except in Romania). Brown, p. 41.

policies and programs has paid off in being accorded relatively more trust than the other states by the Soviet leadership.

E. GDR PARTICIPATION IN COMECON

The German Democratic Republic is the most highly industrialized and technologically advanced country in the Soviet bloc. It is, however, a "processing" economy; that is, it imports raw materials and exports finished products because it is highly deficient in basic industrial raw materials. Aside from low-grade coal and potash, most of its raw materials must be imported--some 80% of its high-grade coal, 96% of its crude oil, 97% of its iron ore, and all of its bauxite, chromium, manganese, and phosphate, as well as large quantities of chemicals, cotton, lumber, and grain. Even its water supply is barely adequate for its needs [Ref. 128]. Some 25-30% of its gross domestic product must be exported to pay for these basic materials. The country is also suffering from a labor shortage and aging plant facilities with very little excess capacity.

As in Czechoslovakia, the inefficiencies inherent in centrally planned economies are currently affecting German productivity. In an attempt to combat these problems, the GDR government has begun a program of concentrating investments in modernization and retooling rather than in building new plants. Additionally they have made great strides in introducing industrial robots into the manufacturing process. There were official reports of 13,000 robots being installed in 1981, but the figures could be somewhat misleading since there seems to be a discrepancy in the definition of an industrial robot [Ref. 129]. In 1979 they also began a two-stage restructuring of the industrial organizations and Foreign Trade Enterprises (FTEs),

representing, perhaps, the most fundamental change in the industrial and commercial organization in almost 20 years. Theoretically this reorganization should make GDR industry more flexible and more responsive to world market conditions. Improvement is expected in terms of quality, price, style, the level of technological and design sophistication, and timely delivery of GDR products to foreign markets [Ref. 130]. Whether this restructuring will accomplish the goals set for it remains to be seen.

The GDR has substantial commitments to the COMECON countries. In the early years after World War II, the GDR was almost totally dependent upon the Soviet Union. And in attempting to become a faithful ally, and thus ensure its continued independent existence, the GDR also traded almost exclusively with other communist countries. Today some 80% of the GDR's highly reputed photographic and optical goods, which could earn it much-needed hard currency, must still be shipped to other communist bloc countries. It also needs high levels of fuel--particularly oil--and is almost totally dependent on the Soviet Union for its supplies. This increases the already substantial political pressure to conform to Soviet wishes.

However, there are also significant pressures to increase trade with the West, particularly West Germany, which would increase the influence of Western ideas in the East. The GDR government has made a commitment to the continued increase in the standard of living for its people, and it recognizes that to accomplish this, it must expand trade and industrial cooperation with the West. The 1981-85 five year plan gives high priority to technology and machinery from the West. This includes automation equipment, computers, industrial robots, electronic controls, and chemical and metallurgical plants. It expects to pay for these imports by expanding "counter trade;" that is, by

supplying Western customers with compensating amounts of steel, chemicals, fertilizers, plastics, and limited amounts of high-precision optical equipment. [Ref. 131]

The prospects for the continued high growth of the GDR economy are highly doubtful at this point. The main problems are those of the increasing energy and raw materials prices, the fact that oil supplies will not increase as needed for general economic expansion, and the GDR's external debt--both hard currency and with the other COMECON countries. The GDR's hard currency debt is higher than any other COMECON country except Poland. The need to service this heavy debt will preclude using extensive Western credits to generate further economic expansion. Additionally the fact that the East German labor force cannot be significantly increased is another limiting factor. One last factor--increased military expenditures--could also become a problem. The members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization have so far resisted the Soviet pressure to increase their military budget, but GDR leaders have made it clear that they must respond in kind to Western military spending, regardless of the impact on their other objectives. They already maintain a significantly higher military budget than other WTO countries. [Ref. 132] There was one significant exception to this position, however. When the Soviets informed their allies that it would deploy more SS-20s in Czechoslovakia and East Germany to counter the new Pershing II threat, both countries took the unusual option of formally and openly opposing that move. According to L'Express sources, that would have required East Germany to increase its military budget by some 17%, which it felt it could not afford. [Ref. 133]

IV. POLAND

Despite its obviously reluctant participation in the Communist system, Poland is the third member of the crucial "Northern Tier" of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), that along with Czechoslovakia and the GDR, represent not only the buffer between the Soviet Union and the West, but also the most highly industrialized and militarily advanced countries within the Soviet empire.

A. POLISH POLITICAL CULTURE

Polish political culture can be described as encompassing individualism, romanticism, social formality, Polish nationalism, patriotism, Catholicism, a preference for Western ideas, and a strong dislike of authority of any kind [Ref. 134]. As with any culture, these characteristics are formed by the country's history. More perhaps than other countries in the Eastern bloc, it is impossible to understand Poland without knowing something of its history. One Polish historian explains it as follows:

Poland has been troubled by a history in which myth is as potent a brew to the Polish imagination as fact. There is not an event in our current travails that cannot find some echo in our history. But because that history is constantly distorted by the authorities, it is also distorted in a completely different way by the public. Because the Party is so terrified by the past, ordinary people cling to it with a passion that is terrifying. We have become a people who can live only in the imagination of what we believe to be the glorious past. [Ref. 135]

From the 15th through the 17th centuries the kingdom of Poland stretched from the Baltic in the north, including Prussia, to the Black Sea in the south, and to within 200

miles of the gates of Moscow, becoming a permanent threat to the state of Muscovy. It had three fatal characteristics that continue to plague the state today: a lack of natural borders, a geographic position at the center of the continent, and the inability of its people to agree among themselves--even when foreign aggression threatened their very existence. The Polish empire also had a kind of democracy long before other countries of the world. Their king was elected by the gentry, and his power was further limited by the parliament, made up of members of the gentry from each region. Each member had an absolute veto over the proceedings and could dissolve the Sejm (parliament) with his vote, thus nullifying all acts passed during that session. Usually members objected to new taxes to fight a new war, but often invading armies bribed a member of Parliament to weaken Poland's ability to defend itself.

In 1772, Catherine the Great of Russia, using the supposed persecution of the Russian Orthodox churches by the Polish Catholics as an excuse, invaded Poland during one of its periodic periods of paralysis due to infighting in the Sejm. In order that Russia not become too powerful, Austria and Prussia also moved in. With most of its members bribed by one of the three nations, the Sejm voted in favor of the First Partition. About 30% of Poland was carved up among the three powers, leaving it with borders even more difficult to defend and a bitter and divided population. [Ref. 136]

Realizing too late what their inability to agree had done to their country, a group of gentry was determined to see that that did not happen again. They voted in a new constitution, the second in the world, which was modelled closely on the American example. If allowed to go unchallenged, however, this new government could have been dangerous to Poland's neighbors, possibly destabilizing

their regimes with similar demands. Once again, in collusion with Sejm members whose power depended upon preserving the old ways, Catherine brought the conservatives to St. Petersburg where they signed an "Act of Confederation" with Russia, and called for Russian troops to put down the liberals. On 18 May 1792, the Russian army crossed Poland's borders for a second time. With Russia and Prussia both grabbing huge sections of Poland, it was partitioned for the second time. The concept of Poland as a buffer state was introduced at this time, calling the remaining land "a barrier between the powers."

Two years later, Tadeusz Kosciuszko, leading an army of peasants, demanded national self-rule, abolition of the monarchy, equal civil rights for all citizens, freedom for the peasantry, and a limited franchise based on property qualification. They fought both Russia and Prussia, and despite several victories won against tremendous odds, the Poles were finally defeated and their leaders fled, primarily to France. The Third Partition of Poland then occurred, reflecting the desire of Austria, Prussia, and Russia to "wipe this troublesome nation off the map." [Ref. 137]

The next 120 years, until Poland obtained its independence in 1918, set the mold of current Polish character. The people were determined that even though their state had been destroyed, that their culture would survive. In 1815 the Congress of Vienna ratified the partitions, but established the tiny kingdom of Warsaw as a sop to Polish pride, and then proceeded to put it under the control of the Czar. In 1830, young men from the School of Cadets in Warsaw rose up against the Czar and held out for a year. Then in 1863, the people rose up again, albeit with no leaders and no expectations of victory. The Russians reacted predictably: they erased the name of the kingdom of Warsaw from the maps,

made the use of the Russian language mandatory in government, business, and schools, and took the land away from the Polish nobility. Prussia followed suit, also attempting to eradicate all vestiges of Polish influence and culture [Ref. 138]. Only in the Habsburg portion of Polish territory were the Poles and their culture allowed to exist without prejudice.

Had it not been for the ceaseless attempts by the Catholic church to keep the Polish language, lore, and literature alive after the partitions, Polish culture would probably have been eradicated [Ref. 139]. Additionally, the Church acquired a quasi-political role, as it had during the twelfth century when national integration had been threatened by lack of internal cohesion and German expansionism. In the absence of a nationally accepted monarch, the Pope acted as head of state and maintained national unity. Also the fact that the two most aggressive partition powers--Prussia and Russia--represented Protestantism and Orthodoxy, respectively, made it easy for the Poles to identify Catholicism with Polish nationality. [Ref. 140]

One other crucial factor in the development of the Polish political culture must be mentioned: the Poles' obsessive attachment to the land. Up to the fifteenth century, during Poland's tenure as a great power, it served as the "breadbasket" of Europe, wheat being the source of the wealth of the nation. By the time of the First Partition, the Poles realized that wealth through trade and manufacturing had gone to the foreigners, leaving them increasingly pauperized in their own country. But dealing with money was still considered beneath contempt and leaving the land was viewed as surrendering one's birthright, so they stayed where they were, becoming poorer and poorer with each generation. Today, this attachment to the land, which thwarts the Communist Party's agricultural collectivization

efforts, still represents a clinging to a semi-noble heritage from the glorious past. [Ref. 141]

As a result of the previously outlined factors, Poland entered the modern period with a perception that they were a unique and separate nation, geographically isolated from their friends, and in constant need of defending themselves against potential enemies--particularly the Soviet Union and Germany. They clung to their "glorious" past and dreamed of regaining some of that greatness [Ref. 142]. Samuel Sharp sums up their attitude toward government:

For more than a century, Poles had learned to look upon government as alien and hostile; for centuries before, they had cultivated active disrespect for government. The fatherland was more often looked upon as a source of privileges, not as responsibility. The population was suspicious of government to the point of not cooperating on any but extreme occasions. [Ref. 143]

Poland officially received its independence in 1918 at the conclusion of World War I, although its borders were not officially drawn until 1923. Independence did not bring the power so long hoped for by the Polish people. Once again the inability to agree among themselves destroyed any hope for concerted national action. It could hardly have been otherwise, though. Poland became independent with six currencies, four official Army languages, eighteen registered political parties, railway gauges of different sizes, three legal codes, three distinct codes of social behavior, and regions with administrations separate from the central authority (such as the industrially important Silesia). The truth was that for all its longing for independence, Poland was simply unprepared to cope with it once it came. [Ref. 144]

Poland was only allowed twenty years to refine its political system before the rise of Hitler and yet another partition. The traditional enmity between the Poles and the

Germans and the Russians was magnified geometrically by World War II. The Germans took the northern, southern, and western parts of Poland, and the Soviet Union the eastern part. Conditions were equally as harsh under both occupation systems. British historian Norman Davies concluded that at that point the Soviet Union was trying to prevent the resurrection of an independent Poland in any form whatsoever. The Poles were saved by the German attack on Russia in 1941, after which Stalin declared amnesty for Polish prisoners. However, once the fighting was over, the remnants of the Polish army who had been hunted by the Germans were then hunted by the Russians. The war had taught Poland a lesson similar to the one learned by Czechoslovakia: that they would receive no help from the West. Whatever they achieved would be achieved by their own efforts. The stage was set for resistance to Soviet domination, a fact that has not changed to this day.

B. THE GOVERNMENT

Stalin was not likely to let Poland go its own way after the war, and when Russian tanks liberated Poland from German occupation in 1944, the Communist Party came in with them. The Party represented only a tiny fraction of the Polish population, but it quickly massed considerable support in spite of the traditional animosity. It became obvious very quickly that the Stalinist-supported Communists were not going to hand over power to the legal government in exile in London, recognized by all Western powers, or even to a coalition of national factions. The elections of January 1947 were rigged in favor of the "Democratic" bloc--controlled by the Communists. As in other countries, all leftist factions were forcefully united into one party which is known as the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). [Ref. 145]

The new government moved quickly to consolidate its power throughout the country, with the help of five groups of people. The first was army officers and professionals who had been compromised in the past and could be blackmailed. The second was prewar civil servants, many of whom really believed that cooperation with a Soviet-approved government was the only hope for Poland. The third was the prewar socialist parties; the fourth was Poles with totalitarian tendencies; and the fifth was a group of prewar socialist politicians who had been won over by the Communists. [Ref. 146]

With that less than auspicious beginning, it is still necessary to examine a little further the early actions of the Communist Party in Poland in order to understand the deep-rooted antipathy and resentment that exists today between the Party and the people. While the eastern half of Poland was still part of the Russian empire (prior to 1918), the Polish contingent was an important part of the illegal Russian Bolshevik Party, whose members thought of themselves as much Russian as Polish. More importantly, they considered themselves part of the international proletariat, regarding such concepts as nationhood outmoded and bourgeois, and when the time came after World War I for Polish sovereignty to be restored, the Communist Party opposed that move. To the Poles, this was treason. Then, in spite of the fact that Stalin expelled the Polish Party from the Comintern, arrested those members living in exile in Russia, executed many, and sent the rest to prison camps, they still looked to Russia for leadership in 1939, and welcomed them as liberators and brothers when the Germans invaded. The fact that the Russians sat on the other side of the river doing nothing while the Germans obliterated Warsaw also has never been forgotten.

The Communist Party was rehabilitated after the German invasion of Russia in 1941, but Stalin established his own front organization in Moscow, which quickly found itself at odds with what was left of the old Party. Once the war was over a struggle developed between the Muscovites, who sought to implant a Stalinist regime using the power of the Red Army, and the Home group led by Wladyslaw Gomulka, who advocated the Polish road to socialism. By 1948, the Muscovites, led by Boleslaw Bierut, an active NKVD agent, were strong enough to move against the Home group, expelling Gomulka and placing him under house arrest, where he remained for eight years.

The Communist Party, thus, has always been regarded as a foreign government--imposed and with no popular mandate. It has always been on the defensive and has never known anything but antagonism and hostility from the people. The psychological effect has been profound. Forming tight little groups which, for the most part avoided non-Party members, the Communists came to think of themselves as an elite, whose special association with the "course of history" exempted them from the rules of ordinary society. They felt themselves to be a group of special people deserving special privileges, whose increasing distance from the reality of existence in Poland led ultimately to their downfall in 1956, 1970, and 1980. [Ref. 147]

The great majority of the Poles agreed that the primary task of the nation after World War II was to unite around a leadership and find a way to get the country moving again. They had no serious objection to nationalization of the basic means of production, i.e. industry. But they balked at collectivization of agriculture, still feeling strongly about the right of the individual to own land [Ref. 149].

As with other Communist countries, the majority of the economic investment was channelled into industry. The

additional demands placed on the Polish economy by the increased military spending for the Korean War severely disrupted the Six Year Plan in existence at that time. The economic costs of integration into the Soviet system during this period were tremendous. Forced coal deliveries to the Soviet Union (at prices much lower than what they could have obtained in the West) were continued. The quality of machinery and goods they received in return was inferior, and many orders from the West were lost because of Soviet monopolization of the export capacity of certain plants. The one saving grace was that these enormous costs were not known to the bulk of the people, or even many intellectuals and Party members. [Ref. 150]

After the death of Stalin in 1953, the Polish people were slowly growing demoralized and disillusioned about the ability of the communist government to fulfill its promises and satisfy the needs of the nation. Then with the Swiatlo revelations⁷ and Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech in February 1956, Party and public morale declined even more rapidly. In June, the suppressed frustration of the people manifested itself in a peaceful march, led by Party members, in Poznan demanding higher wages and an improvement in the general standard of living. It quickly turned into a riot lasting two days, which required the combined forces of the police and security forces backed up by tanks to control it. [Ref. 151] The Central Committee and the Politburo met and decided that Wladyslaw Gomulka, still officially in disgrace, was the only person who could salvage the situation.

⁷Lt. Col. Swiatlo of the Polish Secret Police defected to the West and broadcast over Voice of America the full extent of the Soviet control over Poland and of the activities of the secret police.

For a satellite country to appoint its own First Secretary without suggestion or approval from the Kremlin was unheard of, and as soon as the Soviets became aware of it, they decided they had to act. Marshal Rokossowski, a Polish-born Soviet citizen and commander-in-chief of Polish forces, was ordered to put Soviet troops stationed in Poland on alert. Without the knowledge of the Polish Politburo, he was told to march on Warsaw, but Polish officers, observing the troop movements, informed Rokossowski that the Army supported Gomulka and would fight if necessary to protect his position (in contrast to Czechoslovak actions under similar circumstances. Shortly afterward, a surprised Polish Politburo received word that a Soviet airliner carrying the entire top Soviet leadership, led by Nikita Khrushchev, was asking permission to land. During the initial stormy meeting, Gomulka reportedly turned to Khrushchev and said if the troop movements were not halted immediately, he would inform the Polish people what was happening. He refused to negotiate under that threat. That was the first time the Soviets were forced to concede actions in Poland that they would not tolerate in other satellite countries. [Ref. 152]. Khrushchev himself described the strength of the Polish resistance as follows:

Marshal Konev and I held separate consultations with Comrade Rokossovsky.... He told us that anti-Soviet, nationalistic, and reactionary forces were growing in strength, and that if it were necessary to arrest the growth of these counterrevolutionary elements by force of arms, he was at our disposal.... That was all very well and good, but as we began to analyze the problem in more detail and calculate which Polish regiments we could count on to obey Rokossovsky, the situation began to look somewhat bleak. Of course, our own armed strength far exceeded that of Poland, but we didn't want to resort to the use of our own troops if at all avoidable. On the other hand, we didn't want Poland to become a bourgeois country hostile to the Soviet Union. [Ref. 153]

With the rise of Gomulka to power, the autonomy of enterprises and their managers was considerably increased, the workers' councils that had sprung up spontaneously were legalized, land was substantially decollectivized and markets somewhat reactivated. By 1958, however, with political control restored, it became obvious that Gomulka was not a democrat in communist clothing, so to speak, and a period of re-centralization began. The reforms had made life somewhat more tolerable, however, and the fact that Poland was going to remain a part of the Soviet system for a long time was easier to accept. The Hungarian revolt and the subsequent Soviet invasion, coupled with the West's inability and/or unwillingness to intervene, reinforced that realization.

The government became increasingly illiberal--retreating from attempts at institutional innovation, discouraging genuine participation in the system and promoting closer ties with the Soviet Union. A member of Gomulka's staff offered a reason for this:

Gomulka became convinced from the moment he took power--perhaps it was something Khrushchev had said when he arrived in such a rage--that Russia was prepared to settle the continuing problems of European security and Germany at the expense of Poland. His constant nightmare was that Poland's Western territories, which he had administered when they fell into Poland's hands at the end of the war, would be returned to Germany under an overall general peace settlement. He believed that if he stepped out of line again, then that would be what the Russians would do. [Ref. 154]

As the society grew more rigid and the economy stagnated in the 1960s (Polish workers received the lowest increase in salaries of all East European countries.), tensions rose. The lack of legitimacy of the Gomulka government was becoming apparent when it had to resort to brute force in 1968 during the student revolts. These resulted in anti-intellectual and anti-Semitic purges in the government and

military, followed two years later by the riots in Gdansk and other northern industrial areas over a drastic increase in food prices [Ref. 155]. When it became obvious in 1970 that Gomulka was no longer in control of the situation, another leader acceptable to both Moscow and the Polish people had to be found, or the possibility of Soviet intervention could have become a reality.

Edward Gierek took over the reigns of the Communist Party in 1971, and he understood the basic problems of the Polish economy. He is an example of Jack Bielasiak's "coopted" leader--that is, one who has spent more than six years in a specialized vocation before coming to a government position [Ref. 156]. He was not a "Moscow" man or even a true Home communist, having spent many years in the coal mines of France and Belgium. He only returned to Poland in 1948 with the reputation for efficient management and for securing high wages for his workforce. He was known as a strong man of independent views who allowed no interference in his province of Silesia, which he governed as First Secretary for 13 years [Ref. 157]. His approach to Polish problems was one of cautious reform--of the economy, of the Party, and of state administration [Ref. 158]. It seemed that professional competence was to gain predominance over ideological commitment--a phase the GDR entered in the middle sixties.

Gierek's new economic package was directed to the goal of intensive development--that is, to achieving high productivity and efficiency.

By 1975, however, the failure of his economic strategy became clear to the people. When they were allowed no more say in the matter than they had had before, the attempt to increase the food prices in 1976, caused another uprising. Not wishing a repeat of the 1970 riots which overthrew Gomulka, Gierek backed down.

Once the government reversed its decision on the prices, there seems to have been no more official economic policy making. [Ref. 159]. By 1979, the service on Poland's foreign debt amounted to 94% of the value of its exports on a debt that was over \$20 billion [Ref. 160]. Something had to be done to relieve the pressure on the economy.

This was basically the state of affairs at the time of the next attempt at food price increases in August 1980 which resulted in the formation of Solidarity. Bread-and-butter issues, however, took second place to the demands for fundamental political change [Ref. 161]. And Solidarity won--for a while.

That they succeeded in a measure beyond their wildest hopes was due to four major factors: (1) The political leadership was unable to resist strong demands. (2) The large branch ministries, interested only in increasing their own power, put steady pressure on governmental economic decision. (3) Wage demands were continuous, strong, and irresistible. (4) The interaction of the first three factors produced an economic deterioration which the leadership could not combat because it refused to communicate through popular opinion channels. [Ref. 162]

The problems leading up to martial law in December 1981 were almost identical to those leading to the military takeover by Marshal Pilsudski in 1926--the inability to agree among themselves. The Party was impotent, and Solidarity never resolved the basic problem of whether it should remain an outside pressure group or take some responsibility for actually running the collapsing economy. Nor could the members decide on an acceptable pace of reforms.

With the declaration of martial law, the Communist world experienced another anomaly--military control over the country. Poland was bankrupt, unable to honor its international debts without substantial aid from the Soviet Union,

and was governed by a Party from which the people had withdrawn all support. The situation could not be much worse from the point of view of the Soviets. There were not many options left to them short of actual invasion, which would result in massive resistance from the population, and possibly the armed forces. Since Jaruzelski is Moscow's man, as nearly as his impeccable record can measure loyalty, it would seem that military control was the lesser of the evils. The economy is not out of trouble yet, but the situation seems to have stabilized and is making halting progress.

The situation may have stabilized for the moment, but after a taste of democracy--or at least participation in their government--the Poles will certainly try again to rid themselves of an imposed government. According to Stewart Steven,

For the moment, maybe, the military believes it has things under control. But for how long can it hold down a population that has proved time and time again it is prepared to fight for its rights? Resistance began on the first day martial law was declared; that resistance will gnaw away at the foundations of this regime as it has every other, until it crumbles and once again we will face each other across the barricades, either that or one day this government will eventually capitulate to the will of the Polish people. No people, particularly the Poles, can be kept down against their will forever. December 1981 was merely an interval in our affairs. Those who know Poland know that it cannot be otherwise. Those who know the Poles know that we will never settle for second best. [Ref. 163]

C. THE MILITARY

One of the key aspects of reliability in wartime is obviously the military. The Polish Army under General Jaruzelski is not only the largest non-Soviet force in the WTO, but also one of the best trained and most professional. Because Jaruzelski threw away the Communist "rulebook" in

the early seventies, Polish officers are highly proficient and motivated. With a program similar to that initiated in the GDR, the emphasis was on professional competence [Ref. 164]. Nevertheless, their willingness to fight the West under any circumstance except an actual invasion of their territory must be seriously questioned in view of what has been presented before.

The origin of the Polish People's Army can be traced primarily to the First and Second Polish Armies organized on Soviet territory in 1943, and consisted mainly of Poles who had fled the Nazi occupation. Both armies, however, were dominated by Soviet officers, which, by the end of the war, made up nearly one-third of the officer corps [Ref. 165]. In part, this was due to the lack of availability of Polish officers, many of whom had been killed either by the Germans or the Russians. One particular incident that still rankles with the Polish people today is the massacre in the forest of Katyn in the spring of 1940. Evidence is overwhelming that the Russian NKVD executed over 4,200 Polish officers, and the Poles believe that this was done in an effort to prevent the resurgence of an independent Poland. [Ref. 166]

Prior to 1948, it seems that the Communist Party largely ignored the regular forces, concentrating on creating reliable internal security forces (KBW). But after the consolidation of power in 1948, they turned their efforts to the political consolidation of the army. The ouster of Gomulka on Stalin's orders was followed by a purge of many of the Communists who had fought in Poland rather than in the Soviet Union during the war, and who had assumed important posts in the new army. With the outbreak of the Korean War, Moscow initiated a massive buildup of its own military as well as those of its satellite countries. As a result of conscription in 1949, the Polish army numbered nearly 400,000 men. The new Polish army was made to conform in

every aspect to the Soviet model. And to ensure compliance with that directive, Soviet officers were reintroduced into the army. Marshal Rokossowski, was named Defense Minister and Commander-in-Chief and was directly responsible to the Soviet High Command [Ref. 167]. The Polish Army was structured for mobile defense, but its actual offensive capabilities were questionable at that time due to the poor state of organization and inadequate armaments.

With Stalin's death several waves of demobilization were initiated and defense spending was cut. In the middle of these changes, the 1956 riots in Poznan occurred. The local internal security forces proved unable to deal with the demonstrations and regular army units refused to fire upon the workers. An elite brigade from Warsaw used force to restore order, causing hundreds of casualties. The national outrage against both the KBW and the Party, who ordered the use of force, resulted in command of the KBW being assumed by General Komar, who had been purged along with Gomulka.

This change proved crucial in the October showdown with the Soviet leadership. The Polish army was internally divided between the Soviet generals and the lower-ranking Polish officers sympathetic to Gomulka, which resulted in its virtual neutralization during the crisis. Soviet elements apparently did attempt to arrest Gomulka and his supporters, but General Komar stopped them, and as Rokossowski was ordered to move the Soviet troops toward Warsaw, the KBW took up positions around the city to defend it. Admiral Wisniewski, commander of the coastal defense units, and General Frey-Bielecki, an Air Force unit commander, also prepared their units for armed resistance [Ref. 168]. This threat of resistance ultimately made Khrushchev back down and accept Gomulka.

With Gomulka's return, there was a "renationalization" of the army. National military uniforms and songs were

reintroduced and many of the Soviet forms were discarded. As part of the post-October agreement with the Soviets, thousands of Soviet officers and advisors were replaced by Polish officers. Rokossowski was dismissed from his military duties (replaced by General Spychalski who had also been among those purged with Gomulka), dropped from his government and Party functions, and sent back to the Soviet Union. Poland also managed to obtain a status of forces agreement giving Poland control (theoretically, at least) over Soviet troop movements within Poland and the right to try Soviet soldiers in Polish courts for off-duty crimes [Ref. 169]. It also included a "noninterference in Polish affairs" clause. [Ref. 170]

At the same time Party control of the armed forces was weakened. The Communist youth organization was abolished, ending mass Communist organization within the military. The activity of political officers was reduced, and the company level (lowest level) position of political officer was abolished. Since only a minority of soldiers and about half the officer corps were then subject to Party discipline, the professional military leadership began to reassert itself. Even when it regained its Polish leadership, the armed forces, which traditionally held high prestige among the population, found itself considerably discredited, being viewed as an instrument of a foreign power⁸ [Ref. 171]

The 1960s saw a modernization of all WTO forces. Polish ground force divisions were restructured to conform to the Soviet model. The operational army has 15 divisions, organized into three military regions. Two of these divisions are elite, special-purpose divisions: a sea-landing division, reportedly designated for amphibious landings in

⁸According to the RAND Corporation study, a public opinion poll conducted during that time, the military had fallen to 21st place as a desired profession, behind office workers.

Denmark, and an airborne assault division. By 1969, the armed forces had some 2,800 tanks (T-54s, T-55s), and 750 combat aircraft including MiG-21s. (See table IV)

Indications are that the military modernization was a source of considerable professional satisfaction among the Polish military officers, and yet there is clear evidence that considerable dissatisfaction existed also. Apparently certain officers wished the modernization would proceed at a faster pace. The fact that the Soviet army had new equipment that did not get into the Eastern European armies for years, if at all, and yet made it to Middle East clients was a point of contention. [Ref. 172] This situation came to a head in 1967 when some of the Polish military expressed admiration for the Israeli victory and commented disparagingly on the relatively poor showing made by the Soviet equipment. Officers who openly expressed such opinions were quickly ousted--some 14 generals and 200 colonels [Ref. 173]. Still, in view of the fact that modernization continues to lag substantially behind that of the Red Army, one can speculate that a source of dissatisfaction still exists.

After the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviets made some change in the WTO structure which on the surface gave the Eastern European countries more participation in the organization. They also continued to increase the level of integration and modernization, particularly of the Northern Tier states. As table IV indicates, the size of the Polish military forces increased some 66,000 over the next 15 years. In 1971, as previously mentioned, there was a significant upgrade in Northern Tier forces. In Poland T-62 tanks were added to the inventory, along with Styx, Scud, and Frog surface-to-surface (SSM) missiles, and Snapper, Swatter, and Sagger antitank guided weapons (ATGW). 1975 saw the addition of SA-7 surface-to-air (SAM) missiles,

TABLE IV

Polish Military Force/Equipment 1964-1983

Year	64/65	67/68	71/72	74/75
Pop. (in millions)	31.5	32	33.2	33.41
Tot.mil. force	272,000	270,000	265,000	303,000
Army/AF	215,000/ 45,000	185,000/ 70,000	190,000/ 55,000	220,000/ 58,000
Navy	12,000	same	20,000	same
Para- mil.	45,000 (sec./bord.)	same	65,000	same
Equipment:				
SAM/AAM/ ATGW	SAMs	SA-2	SSMs- Scud, Frog Styx, ATGWs- Snapper, Swatter, Sagger	same
Tanks	3,000 T-10/54	same	3430 T-10/34 54/62	same
Acft.	1,000 MiG-19/21	820 Su-7, Il-12/14 28, helos	730 same	734 SU-20
Year	77/78	80/81	82/83	
Pop.	34.6	35.7	35.9	
Tot.mil. force	307,000	317,500	same	
Army/AF	220,000/ 62,000	210,000 85,000	same 88,000	
Navy	25,000	22,500	same	
Para- mil.	97,000	95,000	85,000	
Equipment:				
SSM/SAM AAM/ATGW	SA-6/7/9	AA-2 Atoll	AA-1 Alkali, SSM-Samlet Spigot, AT-4	
Tanks	3,800 T-34/54 55/62	3,700 T-72	3,130 same	

PT-76

Acft	745	700	705
	same	same	same

Source:

The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, England.

and the SU-20 fighter-bomber (which no other WTO state has), and in 1981, as Poland was experiencing the severe upheaval and ultimately martial law, the T-72 tank was finally introduced into the Polish and other East European armories. The Poles also have in their inventory the SAU-122, and a variety of armored vehicles, including the BMP-1.

Taken separately, such a program of modernization might seem to indicate a rather substantial confidence in the Polish armed forces in spite of the problems in the country. However, with the exception of the SU-20, the improvements that were introduced into the Polish inventory were also introduced into the armories of the GDR and Czechoslovakia. It was to the Soviets' advantage to modernize northern tier defenses, and therefore was not indicative of any special degree of trust.

As with the other Northern Tier countries, another aspect of the Polish armed forces that could suggest a special degree of trust by the Soviets is the existence of specialized units such as the sea-landing and airborne assault divisions. Poland had a division of each as early as 1967 and they were thoroughly integrated into the Soviet plans to cut off the northern NATO flank. An airborne brigade was introduced into Czechoslovakia only in 1971 and a parachute battalion (later upgraded to an airborne battalion) in the GDR in 1975. These units are, as previous stated, reportedly staffed exclusively by volunteers [Ref. 174], and thus would be carefully screened by the Soviets in view of the highly sensitive missions they are to

be assigned. The reliability of these units would obviously be much higher than the reliability of the armed forces as a whole, but because the numbers involved are limited, it would not likely increase the overall reliability much, if any.

As a result of the purges in 1968, General Spychalski resigned the post of Defense Minister and was replaced by General Wojciech Jaruzelski. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, he began to "throw away the rulebook," and stress professional qualifications. The officer corps became almost entirely "Polish." Only a handful of Russian-Poles remain and Poles of Jewish origin were eliminated altogether. In 1972, 81% of all officers came from peasant and worker families. Only 2% of them had had prewar military experience, and Party membership of the officer corps has increased to 85%, with all general officers being Party members [Ref. 175]

From the 1970s to the present, there has been renewed attention on postgraduate refresher training. Political courses are considerably downplayed. Now new Polish officers pass through one of seven military schools, which are degree-granting institutions in which the percentage of the curriculum devoted to political studies has, as with postgraduate studies, been reduced. Additionally, the current officer promotion system places a premium on military skills and less on the arbitrary application of political criteria. Also a special career track for officers viewed early in their careers as candidates for rapid advancement to military leadership positions was established in the form of a "Pool for the Faster Development of the Officer Cadre." [Ref. 176]

The Party continues to stress the "ideological commitment" of the officers, insisting that the "commander can only speak in the language of the Party," but the more

professional the officers become the less reliable they are likely to become. To combat that tendency, the Party leadership has increased material incentives for and attempted to enhance the social prestige of the officer corps to ensure its loyalty (as the GDR did). They have also renewed emphasis on the importance of the political officer as an instrument of control. [Ref. 177]

With the rise of the "military professional," the traditional problems the Soviets have had in implanting political control in Poland, and the military takeover--even by a man with such impeccable credentials as Jaruzelski⁹--must raise the abhorrent specter of a separate power center not controlled by the Party. In view of the history of the Polish armed forces, the Soviets have considerable cause to doubt their reliability, no matter how entwined in the Communist system they become.

D. POLAND IN THE WTO

The uprisings in Hungary and Poland considerably damaged the structures of control with which Stalin had attempted to bind the Eastern European countries to the Soviet Union, and some attempt at assertion (albeit limited) of national interests and sovereignty was seen during the late fifties

⁹Born in 1923, Jaruzelski fought as a junior officer in the Soviet-sponsored Second Polish Army during World War II. He joined the Communist Party in 1947, and later was selected for advanced training at the Higher Infantry School, then to the General Staff Academy in Moscow, from which he graduated with honors in 1955. A year later, at the age of 33, he became the youngest general in the Polish army, and in 1957 was put in charge of the 12th Mechanized Infantry Division. In 1960, he was selected--in an unusual career appointment--to head the Main Political Administration of the Polish Armed Forces. Two years later he was nominated as deputy Minister of Defense, and in 1965 he took over as Chief of the General Staff. In 1968, he became Minister of Defense, as noted earlier, a position which he continues to hold today, along with that of First Secretary. See Andrzej Korfonski, "The Dilemmas of Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Poland: 1945-1981," Armed Forces and Society, Vol 8, No. 1, Fall 1981, p. 6.

and early sixties. In Poland there was a parallel development of military doctrine at that time--one line emphasizing coalition warfare and the other postulating national defense and a separate Polish Front within the WTO.

As there were many Polish officers who were still pro-Soviet, even after the removal of overt Soviet control with the rise of Gomulka, they developed a coalition warfare doctrine which assumed rapid offensive operations onto NATO territory by WTO forces, stipulating that it was the mission of the Polish forces to fight on this front. The central tenet of this doctrine (which, incidentally, has not been seriously questioned by Polish military elite to this day) is that national defense is not possible for a small Communist state and that only in conjunction with the Soviet Union and other WTO members can national security be guaranteed. The primary "threat" to Polish security comes from NATO. Prior to the normalization of Polish-FRG relations in 1970, the threat from the Bundeswehr was always highlighted. [Ref. 178]

Another principal assumption of Polish coalition doctrine is that war in Europe will be nuclear, granting only the possibility of a short conventional phase. The 1970s saw a slight shift toward a longer conventional phase, although the primary emphasis is still on nuclear conflict, which would occur as the conventional phase escalated. This basic assumption of nuclear conflict led to an emphasis on the initial period of conflict, stressing such aspects as preemptive attack based on surprise, deception, rapid offensive operations and maneuverability. In accordance with this coalition doctrine, the entire 15 ground force divisions, the Air Force, and the Navy--not just some of their units--are designated for the "external front"--fighting outside Poland to prevent NATO military operations from occurring on its territory. [Ref. 179]

Polish theorists have never claimed that this doctrine was not originated by the Soviets, but they do claim to have actively participated in its development, offering specific tactical suggestions that have been accepted by the WTO. Among these contributions are the operational tactics involved in river crossings and battle control information systems [Ref. 180]. The most important Polish contribution to military doctrine is that of a separate Polish front, developed by General Zygmunt Duszynski, head of the Chief Inspectorate for Training. This idea would have designated two Polish armies for the task of moving across the North German Plain to the Low Countries with the third army occupying Denmark. The Chief Inspectorate for Training would serve as the peacetime nucleus of the front, having operational departments for this purpose. According to Ross Johnson's interviews with former Polish officers, this is a plausible explanation for the otherwise unusual prominence of the Training Inspectorate within the Polish military organization. It exists outside the General Staff and its head (a deputy Defense Minister) has served as the WTO Joint Armed Forces deputy Commander-in-Chief since 1969. [Ref. 181]

According to former Polish officers, the idea of a Polish Front was officially accepted by the Soviet Union in a meeting of the WTO Military Council, and the idea apparently served as the dominant scenario in the Soviet-Polish command/staff exercises until the late 1960s [Ref. 182]. Whether the Soviets ever actually planned to implement such a plan is open to speculation, in view of the questionable reliability of the Polish forces. The existence of alternate scenarios incorporating the Polish armies into various Soviet fronts could certainly indicate their reservations about the feasibility of the Polish Front.

During 1957 and 1958, Gomulka's foreign minister, Adam Rapacki, proposed the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe and limited withdrawals of foreign troops from the two Germanies and Poland. If accepted, these proposals could have resulted in the disengagement of Polish troops from and Soviet plans for conducting nuclear war with NATO troops, allowing the Poles to define their military mission as exclusively the defense of Polish territory [Ref. 183]. These proposals highlighted the development, apparently on strictly Polish initiative of the "defense of national territory" (obrona terytorium kraju--OTK) doctrine. There is no indication that this doctrine caused the Soviets any problem because, apart from the fact that it was a Polish initiative, its secondary purpose was to facilitate the movement of Soviet reserve forces and supplies across Poland. [Ref. 184]

As was mentioned earlier, the Soviet control was seriously shaken in 1956 as a result of the uprisings, and the specter of national defense must have been extremely alarming. By the mid 1960s the Soviets introduced the system of joint exercises in the WTO to prevent Rumania and Albania from deploying their national defense systems and to keep other Eastern European countries from adopting similar policies. [Ref. 185]

During the 1961-1979 period the Polish armed forces participated in at least 25 ground forces/combined arms WTO exercises, and probably more. Of these 25, 7 were conducted entirely in Poland--involving Russian, German, and Czechoslovak forces; 7 were held completely outside of Poland; and 11 were conducted jointly on the territory of Poland and the GDR or Czechoslovakia. Of these 25 exercises, commanders can be identified for 21; and of those 21, 6 had Polish commanders (Spychalski-two, Chocha-one, and Jaruzelski-three). Of the 15 foreign commanders, 10 were

Soviet officers, 3 were German and 2 were Czechoslovakian.
[Ref. 186]

The Polish armed forces are completely integrated into the WTO to the degree that all of their air defenses and their entire navy would be controlled by a Soviet commander in wartime and their entire ground forces are committed to an "external" front. Also their armaments industry is critical in supplying certain military equipment for the WTO (as will be discussed in the following section). This would seem to indicate a great deal of confidence in the Polish military. However, in view of the Russian-Polish history, this would seem to indicate exactly the opposite. That is, the Poles must be so thoroughly integrated into the Soviet system that they cannot organize opposition to Soviet plans on their own initiative.

E. POLISH PARTICIPATION IN COMECON

While a look at the economic system of each WTO country helps round out the reliability picture, it is particularly important in the case of Poland. It has ostensibly been the failure of the economy which has triggered all the unrest in the last forty years, except in 1968.

Poland entered World War II as a predominantly agricultural, overpopulated, and largely underfed country. It suffered extensive damage during the war, but the worst of the difficulties were under control by 1948, and prospects were good for an ambitious Six Year Plan (1950-55). Until the outbreak of the Korean War, the level of production in the armament industry was low. Only small arms, some artillery, and the requisite ammunition were produced. As Korea heated up, Stalin forced a massive arms buildup not only in the Soviet Union, but by his COMECON "allies" as well. In the summer of 1950, a new "improved" Six Year Plan

was introduced in Poland on short notice. The military buildup was unprecedented for its size and the pace of its implementation. By the end of 1952, scarcely three years later, the plan was fulfilled in every detail. The Polish military industry employed 200,000 people. [Ref. 187] This buildup obviously had serious negative effects on the economy.

With such a disregard for consumer desires and because living standards had deteriorated so drastically, the workers in Poznan marched on Party Headquarters demanding higher wages and a decent standard of living. These quickly turned into riots which could only be controlled by the use of force by the internal security police. These riots ultimately brought Wladyslaw Gomulka out of arrest and into power.

Gomulka tried to restore industrial productivity in Poland by committing more inputs to production. Labor rates, already high by international standards, were increased, and wages were held down to find more resources for investment. Again investment in agriculture suffered greatly, but the defense budget consistently grew much more rapidly than Poland's net material product [Ref. 188]. The only "success" that Gomulka's policies had was that inflation was controlled by holding the growth of wages to around 70% of productivity growth. These policies caused such a squeeze on consumption and decline in the standard of living that the food price increases in December 1970 were the last straw, and once again the population rioted.

Under the constraints of an ailing economy, Edward Gierek tried to restructure Poland's participation in the COMECON division of labor in weapons production. In the 1960s, Poland had produced the Polnocy-class landing ships--80% of which were exported to the Soviet Union--and undertook the modernization of the T-54 tank. In 1969 a

COMECON decision to end the production of MiG fighter aircraft in Poland had serious adverse economic consequences. Gierek in 1971 arranged through COMECON that Poland should begin to produce AN-28 transport aircraft, which have both civilian and military uses, to try to take some of the burden of defense expenditures (which in 1970 was almost double the growth in the net material product) [Ref. 189] off the civilian economy. Nevertheless, during the ten-year period from 1969-79, Poland seems to have borne a disproportionate share of the costs of the COMECON weapons policies, running a negative arms trade balance totaling nearly \$400 million (compared with Czechoslovakia's \$2 billion surplus for the same period.) It was thus faced with the burden of high military expenditures plus the necessity to finance its net arms imports with a large portion of its earnings from non-military exports. [Ref. 190]

Edward Gierek's solution to the Polish economic problems was one adopted to various degrees by other East European countries: accelerated imports of Western technology financed by Western credits instead of making the needed effective reforms--always anathema to Moscow. He counted on the imports to upgrade the quality of Polish capital stock and improve productivity. That it did not happen that way was due to two miscalculations on the part of the planners. One, Western technology, when used in conjunction with Eastern labor without the usual Western market incentives and labor discipline, proved less productive than in the West. Two, within a year or two of the primary imports, the planners discovered that Western technology also required further imports of Western raw materials and semi-manufactures which also had to be bought for hard currency. The growing hard currency shortage made it difficult to maintain the level of imports required for full utilization of the imported technology. [Ref. 191]

Gierek and the political leadership basically lost control of the economy in 1976 when they backed down on the increase in food prices to avoid the 1956-type riots. By 1979 Poland's debt to the West had reached over \$20 billion and the service on the debt 94% of the value of its exports [Ref. 192]. In 1980 the deficit with the West declined somewhat, but this was made up for by increases in raw materials purchased from COMECON countries, particularly the Soviet Union. For the first time in many years, the Poles borrowed heavily from the Soviets. This increased their deficit with the COMECON countries to \$1.2 billion.

Within the framework of the division of labor in COMECON, Poland has been forced to produce goods, including components for the arms industry, that required raw materials and technology imported for hard currency. The Soviet Union, however, has often repaid Poland in rubles at prices that were not equivalent to the real dollar costs. In 1982, the Soviets finally agreed to pay the Polish shipbuilding industry and telephone industry 13.5 million and 1.2 million convertible rubles, respectively, to buy Western components for Soviet ships and telephones. In 1983, Poland's shipbuilding industry must have spent previously to supply the Soviet Union with ships for which Poland was reimbursed in non-convertible rubles. [Ref. 193]

Additionally, because the Polish military industry is less advanced than that of the Soviets, it must price its products lower for both COMECON and other customers. And to top off those problems, Polish military industry, for all its high priority, is badly managed and inefficiently supplied. A related difficulty (not applicable to Romania) resulting from the paradox of Soviet policy is described by Michael Checinski:

If the political situation in one of the COMECON countries becomes critical, the Soviets typically sponsor

very costly joint military maneuvers and/or military intervention. As a result, military spending increases, and military industry expands its production--causing more difficulties for the civilian economy throughout COMECON. This vicious circle obliges each COMECON member-state to pay a high price; and this is particularly true for Poland because of its relatively large army and armament industry. [Ref. 194]

Perhaps the most important constraint on the Polish economy (and national autonomy) is the dominance of Soviet strategy in Eastern Europe. COMECON defense planning, including arms production and arms trade, is theoretically integrated with national economic planning. In reality, most defense planning is approved on the basis of "strategic" rather than financial estimates. Military supply plans are outlined by the COMECON Military-Industrial Commission in coordination with the WTO Command, which cannot be changed without the approval of the Soviet Union. The Soviets argue that this dominance is justified since they bear 80% of the costs of the WTO defense efforts. What they do not say is that the remaining 20% is not equally proportioned among the others and usually does not serve their individual national interests. [Ref. 195]

With the declaration of martial law in Poland in 1981, which resulted in the revocation of the U.S. Most Favored Nation Status, the ongoing discussions with Western bankers about the political unrest inside the country that almost brought on another Soviet military intervention, the Polish economy, for all practical purposes, ground to a halt. Jaruzelski is publicly committed to systemic reform as a way of restoring the economic health [Ref. 196]. He pushed through legislation designed to make industry more efficient by cutting inputs, reducing the role of the ministries in the running of enterprises, and obliging managers to take more responsibility. Tax and credit levers were supposed to replace ministerial direction. New bankruptcy laws could

make the most inefficient enterprises fold. And the private sector, particularly agriculture and services, were to be encouraged.

However, inflation is running over 20% a year and production delays and bottlenecks are already congesting the system. As long as resources for critical industries are still centrally allocated, plans for worker self-management and enterprise decentralization are stalled, and more liberal laws governing joint venture operations remain shelved, the new legislation will have very little effect on the economy. [Ref. 197]

Basically, although the political situation has stabilized for the time being and the economic system is holding together, the economy is still extremely fragile. The real reforms needed to put it on a healthy track are not likely to be sanctioned by the Soviet Union, and the demands by the other COMECON countries will continue to increase, thereby increasing bottlenecks and slowing down all COMECON economies. Therefore, the situation for the near future must be viewed as one of "muddling through." Should a hard winter or some other unforeseen catastrophe occur, the situation in Poland could become chaotic again.

V. CONCLUSIONS

From the previous presentation, it is obvious that the Soviet (i.e. Russian) system of operation does not fit well in any of the Northern Tier states, even though two of them have populations of Slavic origins. It has, in fact, stunted their development in many ways. The domestic political situations are uneasy in each country. It would be difficult to say that the Communist Party holds the allegiance of the people in any of the three countries. Even in East Germany, the most loyal, the population is beginning to openly protest the excessive militarization of their lives, and continues to show a marked preference for things Western rather than Russian. In Czechoslovakia the people are cynical, "playing the game," since they have no other choice; and in Poland the party faces periodic rebellion.

The economies have also suffered. Being forced to adopt Soviet methods, standards, and priorities, as well as being denied access to state-of-the-art Western technology, has blunted their growth potential. Soviet priorities, forced on the Northern Tier both through membership in COMECON and the WTO, do not often coincide with the best interests of the individual countries. Additionally, receiving Soviet oil and natural gas subsidies may have kept them from immediately feeling the effects of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, but it ultimately affected their desire to conserve resources and find alternative energy sources. It also made them more politically dependent than ever on their major energy supplier. Basically, therefore, one would have to characterize overall Czechoslovak reliability as questionable, that of the GDR as solid, for the moment, and that of Poland as practically nonexistent.

The Czechoslovaks are Slavs, but their traditions and culture are decidedly Western. Their history of being the crossroads of East and West has produced a marked preference for negotiation and survival rather than fighting. They are also a proud, intelligent, and literate people who have had a tantalizing taste of successful democracy. Their profound sense of betrayal by Western democracies (1938 and 1948) led them to prefer a socialist system of development for their country, but by 1968 it was clear that their definition of socialism approached the pluralistic system they had set up from 1918-1938, which was definitely unacceptable to the Soviet Union. And in 1968 they were betrayed again--both by the West and by the "motherland of socialism."

The Czechoslovaks are nothing if not pragmatic. They cannot fight the power of the Soviet Union at the moment, so they bide their time. The Husak regime has not succeeded in infusing a sense of loyalty to itself or the Soviet Union to this day. After the Russian invasion, the people opted out of politics and turned their attention to acquiring material things. As long as the Husak government can keep the people satisfied economically, they will generally ignore the regime's slavish endorsement of the Soviet foreign policy line and the lack of individual freedom.

In reference to the Czechoslovak military, it is certainly well-equipped (although not always with the state-of-the-art equipment found in the Soviet inventory) and well-trained, but there is a definite attitude problem which would almost certainly affect how well it would fight in an actual war with the West. The military has never completely recovered from the stigma of not having defended their country in 1968. It suffers from a lack of prestige among their countrymen as well as from the knowledge that it has little to say in the management of its own national affairs. This state of affairs is certainly not conducive to whole-hearted performance alongside the Russians.

The Soviets are undoubtedly aware of these sentiments, both in the military and in the civilian population. In military affairs, as previously mentioned, the Soviets curbed the independence of the Czechoslovak mission in case of a war with NATO. While it is still to be used in the southwestern front, the army will now fight under direct command of a Soviet officer and Soviet units will be alongside it. Indications are that the Soviets would prefer to use them in rear echelon or non-critical positions.

Knowing the importance the Soviets place on "morale in the rear," as Stalin phrased it, or the willingness of the population to support the war, they must obviously be concerned about the attitude of the civilian population. They cannot help but be aware of the fact that discontent continues to fester just below the surface. They will not, however, most likely have to deal with the open rebellion they face in Poland. What they might instead have to face would be a case of bare compliance with their requirements and no more--even sabotage that could not easily be traced to a single person or plant, such as a slowing down of work or "accidental" misplacement of some critical part for a time, etc.

They might not actually be worried about open rebellion, but since 1968, they have gradually strengthened the National Security Corps--the equivalent of the dreaded Polish ZOMO--to guard against that possibility. While the Czech version does not evoke quite as fearful an image as its Polish counterpart, its strength is about 11,000 troops, or 7 brigades, it is equipped with armored fighting vehicles and antitank weapons. The Soviets are directing the upgrading and the professional education and training of these troops. There are no indications that they are being trained to accompany (or take the place of) regular army troops; thus, as with other communist bloc countries, their

purpose is to keep the people under control, rather than to keep the enemy out.

The German Democratic Republic would have to be characterized as the most reliable ally in the Northern Tier and probably second only to Bulgaria in all of Eastern Europe. That part of Germany which became the GDR retained the basic characteristics of the culture--conservatism, excessive deference to authority, resistance to change, and deep religious faith.

While the Lutheran tradition runs counter to the communist ideals, the other characteristics--particularly submission to authority--fit in quite well with communist plans. Germany was a fractured country after World War II, and Stalin jumped at the chance to establish a firm foothold in industrialized Central Europe. The leadership of the GDR was quite aware of how dependent the country was on the Soviet Union for its very existence and sought to ensure its continuation by slavish imitation of the Soviet system and foreign policy positions.

Integration into the Soviet-controlled socialist system is evident in the GDR to a degree not found in any other communist state. The SED leadership has used this integration to ensure continued Soviet commitment to the GDR, to demonstrate its loyalty, and to consolidate its power internally. In fact, the GDR's frequent demonstrations of the "defense readiness" of its military are another way of saying to the Soviets that the country is worth defending because it intends to make every effort to defend itself [Ref. 198], in much the same way that many West Germans see the Bundeswehr as the price for NATO protection.

But with the signing of the Basic Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1971, signs began to appear that indicated that the Russian system did not fit as well as the leadership of both countries would like. The

resurging popularity of everything Western among the young--music, movies, clothes, etc--as well as the growing pacifism (evidenced by the size of the unofficial peace march in 1982) and such unusual occurrences as official reluctance to have new Soviet missiles placed in Germany and the two-day delay in following the Soviet lead to withdraw from the 1984 Olympics (in spite of an obviously previously coordinated decision), indicate that there is not complete harmony between the two governments. The most recent indication of Soviet displeasure with increasingly independent East German actions was the substantial pressure that was applied to force Honecker to cancel his official visit to West Germany in September of 1984. That would have been the first official visit by the East German head of state to the FRG. Obviously the Soviets are troubled by the increasing closeness of the two states. Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, the political reliability of the GDR is not in question.

The East German military is without a doubt the number two army (with respect to quality) in the WTO, second only to the Soviets. While they might not have the most up-to-date equipment, they certainly have the same as the other Northern Tier states, and, more importantly, they have a cooperative, even aggressive, attitude in military training exercises. There is also no doubt that the NVA is highly visible as a Soviet proxy in many parts of the world, work that was previously handled by Czechoslovakia prior to 1968, and which is only entrusted to "reliable" allies.

The question in the minds of many Western analysts of whether East Germans would fight West Germans is addressed below by a former NVA officer:

I believe that the hate cultivated (against the West and the Bundeswehr) will bring results. I would warn you against underestimating this problem. There will be shooting; nobody in the NVA would say, 'Those people are

Germans.' They will fight; I am totally convinced of this. In terms of the purely military situation, when the commander stands behind me, I have to shoot. In terms of the psychological aspect of it, the soldier on the other side is a soldier of the Bundeswehr. That is of no interest to me at all. [Ref. 199]

Poland would obviously be classified as "unreliable." To repeat the earlier assessment of Polish culture, it is individualistic, romantic, socially formal, extremely nationalistic and patriotic, Catholic, and Western in outlook. The Russian Byzantine mentality does not overlay smoothly. The hundreds of years of enmity between the Poles and the Russians have certainly not been improved by the Communist domination of Poland since World War II. The Poles continue to blame the Russians for almost everything that is wrong with their country. And yet, by virtue initially of their geographic position, and subsequently by their participation in the WTO and COMECON, they are irrevocably bound up with the Soviets.

Militarily, Poland has the largest army in Eastern Europe. It is technologically modern and well trained. Most of the officers are members of the Communist Party and could be expected to have a considerable interest in maintaining the status quo, since promotion to the highest levels of command depends ultimately upon Soviet approval. Chances are they have been coopted by the system. Nevertheless, they are Poles. The enlisted force is technically proficient, rote-trained, and used to maneuvering in a multinational setting. But even more than the officers, they are Poles. They are drawn directly from day-to-day life and are only a part of the military for two to three years. They reflect the socialization of the masses, and they generally do not like Russians.

In a short war, with swift victories accruing to the WTO, the key to reliability would be the officer corps and

their ability to get the troops to obey them. For this reason the Soviets spend so much time and effort in coopting them. They do not have the economic capabilities to fight a long war and are afraid of the defection of the troops in that case. The elite units (airborne and sea-landing) can be expected to be loyal, and possibly the rest of the officers fighting outside of Poland and against Germany could be expected to perform well if they felt Poland had been in danger of being invaded or attacked. The question would be, could the Soviets convince them that the West was making or had intended to make an attack? In view of the tendency to assume the opposite of what is reported in the official press, even in a situation of heightened tensions between East and West, this seems unlikely.

As mentioned briefly at the beginning of this study, there is one conceivable circumstance under which Poland would fight as a relatively reliable ally of the Soviets: that is, if they were subject to an unprovoked attack by the West. Because of its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union, Poland contains a large part of critical Soviet lines of communication and resupply. According to Western war plans, attacks would be carried out deep in the enemy's rear in order to disrupt their communications and supplies. If, by some chance, an attack was made on NATO by the Soviets and other Pact forces in which Poland did not take part, Poland could still expect a Western counterattack on its territory because of the communications and supply points. Under that circumstance, the West could certainly expect the Poles to fight wholeheartedly to defend their country. (However, that would not necessarily preclude some Polish sabotage of Soviet positions or equipment.)

Politically, the Communist Party has always been seen as an alien government imposed on the Poles. With the history of successful opposition to Party policies, under similar

economic situations or even political ones, the people are likely to keep up the fight against them. No matter which way one analyzes the situation, it seems clear that under almost any conceivable circumstance, within the next five years or the next twenty years, the Poles will be the most unreliable state within the Communist bloc.

Another ingredient that must be examined in this analysis is the fact that almost every country in the Eastern bloc will face a leadership succession crisis soon, in addition to increasing economic difficulties. If a younger generation of leaders arrives simultaneously, or nearly so, in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the situation could become very tense. It remains to be seen whether the younger generation in these countries will continue to become coopted by the system as long as they have "things." At some point in time, "things" usually lose their attractiveness if "freedom" is lacking.

While war with the West at that time would be unlikely (as both sides would no doubt do all they could to minimize contact during such a crisis, as in 1968), a spillover effect could occur if the Soviets were forced to invade and the national armies resisted. If the ensuing conflict were pushed over their borders into a Western country, problems with NATO could occur. In that case, the reliability of the Northern Tier would be practically zero, as they would not have been attacked by the West, and would probably see a chance to rid themselves of Soviet domination.

Obviously the primary Soviet concern under those circumstances would be to maintain control of its satellites. It is possible that we could see more military governments, in spite of the Soviet aversion to having a separate power center apart from the Party, or more Soviet invasions. The problem with invasion, apart from receiving world condemnation and the problems of explaining to the communist bloc

why "fraternal brother states" are fighting each other, is that such occurrences could seriously strain an already overburdened Soviet economy. That could ultimately produce another occasion to challenge Communist control, although it might not be immediately obvious because the Russian people are more or less accustomed to the harsh economic sacrifices demanded by their government. The situation could be doubly dangerous if the Soviets were being challenged simultaneously in other parts of the world.

All indications are that the Soviets will sacrifice a great deal to maintain control over their Eastern European satellites, for the reasons mentioned at the beginning of this analysis. One could reasonably expect the Soviets to do everything possible in the near future to link the economies and militaries of the Northern Tier to each other and to the Soviet Union in order to ensure dependence and compliance with Soviet wishes. They are no doubt aware that what was said of Poland earlier could also be true of all their satellites: that no people can be kept down against their will forever.

APPENDIX A
CHAPTER II FIGURES

Survey No. 14

June 30 to July 10, 1968

N = 397

Source: The whole territory of the C.S.S.R.

Question: Would you prefer that Czechoslovakia relinquish the building of Communism and enter the way of capitalist development, or do you wish to continue building socialism?

	<u>Percent</u>
1. I prefer capitalist development	5
2. I am for the continuation of socialist development	89
3. I do not know, I have not thought about it	<u>6</u>
	100

N = number of respondents.

Source: Jaroslav A. Piekalkiewicz,
Public Opinion Polling in Czechoslovakia, 1968-69
1972, p. 4

Figure A.1 Support for a Continued Socialist Society

August 4-15, 1968

N = 2,947

Source: Northern Czech-lands, Eastern Czech-lands, Southern Moravia, and the city of Prague

Question: What are the greatest guarantees of socialist democracy? Make three choices in order of importance.

	Adult				According to					
	population				political affiliation					
	(18 and		Members		Nonmembers		Agrarians		Socialists	
	over)		KSC		KSC					
	Avg.*	Or-der	Avg.*	Or-der	Avg.*	Or-der	Avg.*	Or-der	Avg.*	Or-der
1. The leading role of the rejuvenated KSC	.53	1	.79	1	.44	2-3	.10	5	.10	5
2. The National Front and its democratic program	.50	2	.53	2	.49	1	.44	2	.40	3
3. The influence of the large social organizations	.14	5	.16	5	.13	5	.04	6	.04	6
4. The expression of public opinion in the press, radio and television	.34	4	.25	3	.37	4	.41	3	.43	2
5. The activity of existing non-Communist parties	.08	6	.03	6	.09	6	.34	4	.31	4
6. The possibility of choice by the citizens in elections among various independent political parties	.38	3	.21	4	.44	2-3	.70	1	.64	1

Figure A.2 Guarantees of Socialist Democracy

April 20-21, 1968

N = 300

Source: The whole territory of the C.S.S.R.

Question: Please identify those contemporary public figures in whom you have the greatest confidence.

(in percent)

	<u>C.S.S.R.</u>	<u>Czech-lands</u>	<u>Slovakia</u>
1. Dubcek	39.7	28.0	67.5
2. Smrkovsky	17.1	23.1	2.7
3. Svoboda	12.5	14.9	6.8
4. Cisar	11.5	15.9	1.6
5. Husak	6.7	1.7	18.8
6. Sik	5.1	6.9	.5
7. Goldstucker	4.8	6.8	--
8. Hanzelka	1.8	2.5	--
9. Novomesky	<u>.8</u>	<u>.3</u>	<u>1.9</u>
	100.0	100.1	99.8

September 14-16, 1968

Czech responses

1. Dubcek	96.1
2. Svoboda	95.6
3. Smrkovsky	73.3
4. Cernik	72.6
5. Cisar	37.6
6. Husak	23.6
7. Sik	15.7

Slovak responses

1. Dubeck	97.8
2. Svoboda	94.6
3. Cernik	69.8
4. Smrkovsky	69.7
5. Husak	61.2
6. Cisar	10.4

Others receiving support

Pavlenda

Dzur

Novomesky

Tazky

Source: Piekalkiewicz, pp. 253, 262

Figure A.3 Most Trusted Politicians

April 8-16, 1968

N = 2,183

(in percent)

	-W.A.	-10	-7.5	-5	-2.5	0	+2.5	+5	+7.5	+10
National total	5	--	--	1	--	14	5	29	9	41
Sex										
Men	5	--	--	1	--	11	5	29	9	43
Women	5	--	--	1	--	16	5	30	8	39
Size of place										
Under 1,000 pop.	--	--	--	--	--	14	7	29	8	40
1,000-4,999 pop.	20	1	--	2	--	13	4	26	7	48
5,000-19,999 pop.	--	--	--	--	--	12	4	31	11	41
20,000-100,000 pop.	--	--	--	--	--	13	5	33	10	36
Over 100,000 pop.	--	--	--	--	--	16	8	32	9	34
Age										
18-29 years	15	1	--	1	--	13	6	29	9	40
30-39 years	5	--	--	1	--	12	6	32	9	39
40-49 years	5	--	--	1	--	14	4	27	10	42
50-59 years	--	--	--	--	--	13	5	31	8	42
60 years and over	5	--	--	1	--	17	4	27	6	44
Occupation										
Worker	--	--	--	--	--	14	4	30	10	40
Farmer	--	--	--	--	--	7	10	23	8	52
Clerical										
staff/manager	15	1	--	1	--	10	7	32	10	40
Engineer	10	--	--	2	--	10	7	28	14	37
Service worker	10	--	--	2	--	14	5	34	7	37
Housewife	--	--	--	--	--	17	4	31	5	42
Retired	--	--	--	--	--	19	5	29	7	39
Education										
Elementary--9 years										
schooling	--	--	--	--	--	15	5	29	8	41
Secondary, higher--12										
years schooling	5	--	--	1	--	12	5	31	9	41
University or										
college	10	--	--	2	--	6	10	26	13	42
Party membership										
Yes	10	--	--	2	--	11	2	27	9	49
No	--	--	--	--	--	15	6	30	9	38
Are you a member of a										
local government council?										
Yes	10	--	--	2	--	10	3	29	9	46
No	--	--	--	--	--	15	6	30	8	39

Source: Piekalkiewicz, pp. 270, 271

Figure A.4 Extent of Dubcek's Popularity

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| 13. | SFC Tony Paolini
152 Taylor Street
Monterey, CA 93940 | 1 |
| 14. | Sgt. Robin T. Oehler
2534 Jacquelyn Lane
West Sacramento, CA 95691 | 1 |
| 15. | Sgt. Barry E. Smith
Rt. 5, Box 286-D
Granite Falls, NC 28630 | 1 |
| 16. | Sgt. Glenn E. West
3483 Student Squadron
Box F-1618
Presidio of Monterey, CA 93944 | 1 |
| 17. | SSG Mike Nephew
RD 3, Box 153
Milton, PA 17847 | 1 |

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